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Austin Sarat’s When the State Kills explores the
interrelationship between capital punishment and American culture.
Utilizing scholarly approaches drawn from sociology, literary
criticism, cultural studies, and political science, Sarat illuminates
ways in which the official legal regime of capital punishment creates,
reflects, and reinforces broader cultural attitudes about crime and
punishment. Moreover, he argues that the destructive cultural
consequences of state killing provide reasons for abolition over and
above criminological or doctrinal arguments against the practice.
Thus, When the State Kills is a powerful intervention in the ongoing
death penalty debate, but it is also a case study for considering the
benefits of studying law through a cultural lens. This Review Essay
suggests that a cultural analysis of law is more than simply an “addon” to doctrinally focused legal policy debates. Instead, sociolegal
scholarship provides useful insights into just the sort of normative
questions that are at the heart of such debates. A cultural approach
demands that we attend to the important relationship between law
and culture: how legal institutions construct social reality, how
“law talk” gets dispersed throughout society, how individuals deploy
and resist legal norms, and how law symbolically reflects and
reinforces deep cultural attitudes, fears, or beliefs.
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When I served as a law clerk to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, during the
United States Supreme Court’s 1997–1998 term, I found the death penalty
cases by far the most emotionally wrenching part of the job. Several times
every week, some person was scheduled to die somewhere in the country
(usually in Texas or Virginia),1 and so the Justices and clerks would be on alert
all day and often into the night, waiting to receive any appeals or motions that
might be filed.
One night I remember sitting in my office with several clerks from other
chambers discussing our role in the administration of the death penalty. Of
course, in one sense we had no role at all. After all, clerks make no decisions
on legal cases; Justices do. But viewed from a broader perspective, we as
clerks were part of the administrative bureaucracy of the killing state. We
talked that night about the possibility that, perhaps decades in the future, if the
death penalty comes to be seen in this country as a human rights abuse, we
might be called to account for our complicity. And as we all know, “I was just
following orders” would not likely be a valid excuse.2
This sort of soul searching is just one example of the myriad indirect
cultural byproducts of capital punishment in American society. Nevertheless,
although legal scholars, criminologists, legislators, religious leaders, and others
have long debated the pros and cons of the death penalty as a moral or policy
matter,3 few have attempted to discuss systematically what might be called the
1. Of the 142 people executed in the United States between January 1997 and December
1998, fifty-seven of those executions were carried out by the State of Texas and twenty-two by
the State of Virginia. No other state had more than nine during the same period. Bureau of
Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bulletin: Capital Punishment 1998, NCJ 179012, at 1
(stating that of sixty-eight executions that year, twenty were carried out by Texas and thirteen by
Virginia); Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bulletin: Capital Punishment 1997,
NCJ 172881, at 1 (stating that of seventy-four executions that year, thirty-seven were carried out
by Texas and nine by Virginia).
2. Cf. The Charter and Judgment of the Nürnberg Tribunal: History and Analysis;
Statement Submitted by the Secretary General at 41, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/5, U.N. Sales No.
1949.V.7 (1949) (rejecting the suggestion that, where an act in question is an act of State, those
who carry out the act are not personally responsible).
3. See generally, e.g., 147 Cong. Rec. S7418–19 (daily ed. July 10, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Feingold) (addressing the fairness of administration of death penalty); 147 Cong. Rec. H3265
(daily ed. June 20, 2001) (statement of Rep. Lewis) (asserting death penalty is “not worthy of a
great Nation”); Walter Berns, For Capital Punishment: Crime and the Morality of the Death
Penalty 8–9 (1979) (arguing that, though death penalty is a “terrible punishment, []there are
terrible crimes and terrible criminals” deserving such punishment as a moral matter); Louis P.
Pojman & Jeffery Reiman, The Death Penalty: For and Against (1998) (presenting an essay for
each side of death penalty debate); Ernest van den Haag & John P. Conrad, The Death Penalty: A
Debate (1983) (articulating various arguments for and against death penalty); Hugo Adam Bedau
& Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 21,
56–64 (1987) (setting forth statistical analysis of capital cases involving potentially innocent
defendants in the United States in the twentieth century); Stephen B. Bright, Will the Death
Penalty Remain Alive in the Twenty-First Century?: International Norms, Discrimination,
Arbitrariness, and the Risk of Executing the Innocent, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 4–10 (2001) (arguing
that poor quality of defense counsel in criminal cases and risk of executing innocent render death
penalty fundamentally unfair); Conference, The Death Penalty in the Twenty-First Century, 45
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cultural life of capital punishment: the social, psychological, and symbolic
meanings embedded in both the fact that we sanction such state violence and
the method by which this violence is carried out.4
Austin Sarat’s When the State Kills offers this type of cultural approach.
Although Sarat clearly and unequivocally positions himself in opposition to
capital punishment,5 he offers something far different from the usual set of
policy arguments about, for example, whether capital punishment truly deters
crime6 or whether imposition of the death penalty poses an undue risk that
Am. U. L. Rev. 239 (1995) (debating death penalty policy); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating
and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment
Scheme, 6 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 345, 360–91, 459 (1998) (evaluating Supreme Court’s death
penalty jurisprudence and concluding that “the paradox of the arbitrary mandatory death penalty
system can be eliminated only be [sic] eliminating the death penalty”); James S. Liebman, The
Overproduction of Death, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 2030, 2048 (2000) (arguing that “trial actors have
strong incentives to”—and do—“overproduce death sentences,” condemning to death men and
women who, under state substantive law, do not deserve that penalty); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan
M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation
of Capital Punishment, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 355, 371–403 (1995) (examining previous twenty years
of Supreme Court jurisprudence and concluding that Supreme Court has produced a “complicated
regulatory apparatus that achieves extremely modest goals with a maximum amount of political
and legal discomfort”); Jeff Brumley, Justice vs. Forgiveness, Press J., May 12, 2001, at C1
(discussing views of Christian ministers who support death penalty); Peggy Fletcher Stack,
Utah’s Catholic Bishop to Stress Pope’s View on Capital Punishment, Salt Lake Trib., Mar. 31,
1995, at A1 (discussing Pope’s statement condemning death penalty).
4. For two notable exceptions, see The Killing State: Capital Punishment in Law, Politics,
and Culture (Austin Sarat ed., 1999); Machinery of Death (David R. Dow & Mark Dow eds.,
forthcoming May 2002). For several studies of capital punishment in historical context, see
generally William J. Bowers et al., Legal Homicide: Death as Punishment in America, 1864–
1982 (1984); Louis P. Masur, Rites of Execution: Capital Punishment and the Transformation of
American Culture, 1776–1865 (1989); Society’s Final Solution: A History and Discussion of the
Death Penalty (Laura E. Randa ed., 1997); Daniel A. Cohen, In Defense of the Gallows:
Justifications of Capital Punishment in New England Execution Sermons, 1674–1825, 40 Am. Q.
147 (1988); Mark Costanzo & Lawrence T. White, An Overview of the Death Penalty and Capital
Trials: History, Current Status, Legal Procedures and Cost, 50 J. Soc. Issues 1 (1994); John F.
Galliher et al., Abolition and Reinstatement of Capital Punishment During the Progressive Era
and Early 20th Century, 83 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 538 (1992); Keith Harries, The Last Walk:
A Geography of Execution in the United States, 1786–1985, 14 Pol. Geography 473 (1995);
George L. Haskins, Ecclesiastical Antecedents of Criminal Punishment in Early Massachusetts,
72 Mass. Hist. Soc’y Proc. 21 (1957–60); Norman Krivosha et al., A Historical and Philosophical
Look at the Death Penalty—Does It Serve Society’s Needs? 16 Creighton L. Rev. 1 (1982).
5. Sarat summarizes his objections to capital punishment in the introduction:
State killing damages us all, calling into question the extent of the difference between the
killing done in our name and the killing that all of us would like to stop and, in the process,
weakening, not strengthening, democratic political institutions. It leaves America angrier, less
compassionate, more intolerant, more divided, further from, not closer to, solutions to our
most pressing problems.
Austin Sarat, When the State Kills 15–16 (2001) [hereinafter Sarat, When the State Kills].
6. Compare, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Death Penalty 5–10 (1994) (arguing that a deterrence
rationale cannot justify death penalty), and Rudolph J. Gerber, Death Is Not Worth It, 28 Ariz. St.
L.J. 335, 342–50 (1996) (describing eight different research methods for analyzing deterrence
value of capital punishment and concluding that none of the eight leads to conclusion that capital
punishment deters crime), with Berns, supra note 3, at 87–103 (challenging social science studies
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innocent people will be executed.7 Instead, Sarat, a leading figure in the Law
and Society movement and co-founder of the Department of Law,
Jurisprudence, and Social Thought at Amherst College, seeks to explore the
interrelationship between capital punishment and American culture. Utilizing
scholarly approaches drawn from sociology, literary criticism, cultural studies,
and political science, Sarat illuminates the ways in which the official legal
regime of capital punishment creates, reflects, and reinforces broader cultural
attitudes about crime and punishment. Moreover, he argues that the
destructive long term cultural consequences of the death penalty provide a
reason for abolition over and above any criminological or doctrinal arguments
against the practice. In short, he demands that we consider “what the death
penalty does to us, not just what it does for us.”8
Thus, When the State Kills offers both a powerful intervention in the
ongoing debate about capital punishment and an opportunity to consider more
generally the benefits of studying law through a cultural lens. Recently, Paul
Kahn has argued that a cultural analysis of law could free cultural legal
scholars from the need to offer normative arguments that seek to improve legal
doctrine or practice. Instead, Kahn encouraged those studying law as a cultural
system to move “away from normative inquiries into particular reforms and
toward thick description of the world of meaning that is the rule of law.”9
According to Kahn, if scholars can resist being seduced into focusing on the
policy implications of their work, they will better study law the way a religious
studies scholar studies religion: not from the perspective of one who is
committed to advancing the practice under consideration, but as a more
disinterested observer seeking simply to understand the cultural meaning of the
practice.10 Kahn argued that it is a mistake for scholars to be too invested in
legal practice, regardless of whether they see themselves as law’s custodians or
law’s reformers. Rather, we would be better off suspending our belief in law’s
rule altogether,11 thereby allowing us to analyze legal practice without a
purporting to show that capital punishment has little or no deterrent effect), and Ernest van den
Haag, In Defense of the Death Penalty: A Legal-Practical-Moral Analysis, 14 Crim. L. Bull. 51,
57–61 (1978) (citing studies suggesting that death penalty does have some deterrent effects).
7. Compare, e.g., James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases,
1973–1995, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1839, 1849–50 (2000) (summarizing study finding that, from 1973 to
1995, 68% of capital judgments that were subject to judicial inspection were overturned due to
errors that substantially undermined reliability of guilt finding or death sentence imposed at trial),
with Joseph L. Hoffmann, Violence and the Truth, 76 Ind. L.J. 939, 941–46 (2001) (contesting
Liebman’s statistics), and Barry Latzer & James N.G. Cauthen, Capital Appeals Revisited, 84
Judicature 64, 64–71 (2000) (challenging Liebman’s analysis and arguing that conviction reversal
rate in death penalty cases is closer to 27% than 68%, in part because Liebman failed to
distinguish between reversals of convictions and reversals of death sentences). See also Valerie
West, Jeffrey Fagan & James S. Liebman, Look Who’s Extrapolating: A Reply to Hoffmann, 76
Ind. L.J. 951, 951–56 (2001) (criticizing Hoffmann for making false assumptions and trivializing
substantive unfairness in death penalty cases).
8. Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 14.
9. Paul W. Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructing Legal Scholarship 91 (1999).
10. See id. at 3–6.
11. Id. at 3.
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normative agenda.
Kahn’s argument recalls decades of debate about so-called “law and . . .”
scholarship.12 Starting with the legal realist attack on formalism in the early
part of the twentieth century, critical legal scholars have long argued that law
study and discourse must encompass more than legal doctrine itself. In many
respects this critique has been successful. Certainly fields such as economics
or political science have made substantial inroads within legal scholarship and
judicial decisionmaking, and one is hard pressed to find too many doctrinaire
legal formalists remaining among either academics or legal practitioners.
Nevertheless, as Kahn’s book makes clear, a cultural analysis of law is
still not adequately embraced at law schools around the country. Although
formalism is out of favor, most legal scholarship and law school courses
continue to be focused on legal doctrine and concerned with arguments
attempting either to justify or reform legal rules. And while this “doctrinalist”
approach now embraces certain limited fields of interdisciplinary scholarship,
analysis of the cultural, sociological, psychological, and symbolic significance
of law remains mostly outside the ambit of “mainstream” legal debates about
doctrine and reform.
I believe such marginalization of cultural analysis is unfortunate.
Accordingly, although I embrace Kahn’s argument that a cultural study of law
is essential whether or not such study suggests ways of reforming legal
practice, I fear he may be conceding too much by relegating cultural analysis
to a world wholly outside of legal academia’s reformist emphasis. As I hope to
suggest in this Review Essay, viewing law through a cultural lens not only
creates a separate and autonomous body of important knowledge about law (as
Kahn recognizes), it also can provide useful insights into just the sort of
normative questions that are at the heart of doctrinal or policy oriented
debates.13
Thus, the cultural analysis of law is both a vital field of academic
knowledge in its own right and a way of shedding new light on practical
questions concerning legal rules and institutions. A cultural approach ensures
that we will always attend to the important relationship between law and
culture: how legal institutions construct social reality, how “law talk” gets
dispersed throughout the culture, how individuals deploy and resist legal
norms, and how law symbolically reflects and reinforces deep cultural
attitudes, fears, or beliefs. This broader view of law can provide a distinctive
framework for recontextualizing established legal doctrine or reconceiving
intractable policy debates. Indeed, Sarat’s book concludes by employing his
12. For a particularly elegant discussion of the need for multiple approaches due to the fact
that no single explanatory framework can satisfactorily describe human action, see Arthur Allen
Leff, Law and, 87 Yale L.J. 989 (1978).
13. Thus, while a cultural analysis of law need not be yoked to the demands of
policymaking (and may even benefit from resisting the policy audience, see Austin Sarat & Susan
Silbey, The Pull of the Policy Audience, 10 L. & Pol’y 97, 140–42 (1988)), we should
nevertheless recognize that such scholarship often may yield important policy insights.
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cultural analysis to support the argument that the death penalty violates the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee, whether or not one believes it
to be cruel and unusual punishment in all situations.14 Accordingly, When the
State Kills allows us to see the ways in which paying attention to law as a
cultural practice is an essential component even of more doctrinally focused
legal scholarship and teaching.
Part I of this Review Essay briefly summarizes the critical legal tradition
from which Sarat’s work arises. Part II then uses Sarat’s book to identify four
specific benefits of a cultural analysis of law. First, such an analysis can help
us to go beyond the stated rationale for legal norms by considering the
symbolic content of those norms. Second, a study of law that includes cultural
and sociological investigation can provide us with “on the ground” data
concerning the ways in which those who participate in or experience the legal
system actually understand, respond to, manipulate, or resist legal norms.
Third, studying the narratives used in official legal settings offers insights
about the way law’s stories both structure and reflect our experience of the
world. Fourth, a broader understanding of what counts as legal discourse
allows us to see how the “law talk” that is diffused throughout everyday life
and popular culture can become a source of alternative conceptions about law.
Each of these benefits, in addition to providing a deeper awareness of how law
functions as a cultural mechanism for constructing meaning, also opens up new
avenues for discussing normative questions about legal doctrine itself. And, as
the Conclusion to this Review Essay points out, cultural analysis, by
complicating our assumptions about the relationship of law to society, can
even be seen as supporting a more robust democratic discourse.
Of course, interdisciplinary legal scholars have been identifying (and
demonstrating) these benefits for decades.15 The lesson, however, cannot be
reiterated too often. We must continually remind ourselves of the need to
study law in a broader context, and we must continue to ensure that those who
are concerned with reforming legal doctrine consider the insights of scholars
drawing from the humanities and social sciences (and not just economics or
public choice theory). Moreover, Sarat’s book, though it does not purport to
be a detailed ethnographic study, provides a particularly useful vehicle for
discussing the advantages of a cultural approach. Because it is intended to
speak to a popular audience, When the State Kills allows us to see how a
cultural analysis of law might actually contribute to public discourse.
Capital punishment is fast becoming a peculiarly American institution.
Indeed, while nearly every other industrialized nation has abolished the
practice,16 the death penalty in America continues to be imposed regularly17
14. Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 246–60; see also infra text accompanying
notes 227–239.
15. See infra notes 20–50 and accompanying text.
16. See
Amnesty
Int’l,
Abolitionist
and
Retentionist
Countries,
at
http://www.web.amnesty.org/rmp/dplibrary.nsf/ff6dd728f6268d0480256aab003d14a8/daa2b6022
99dded0802568810050f6b1!OpenDocument (last visited Sept. 1, 2001) (on file with the

313664.DOC

2002]

6/18/2002 10:12 AM

CULTURAL ANALYSIS

107

and remains overwhelmingly popular.18 Thus, support for capital punishment,
whatever its defects, appears to be the product of deep cultural imperatives
within American society, and scholars considering the impact of state
sanctioned killing must attend not only to the criminological issues involved,
but to these cultural factors as well.
Moreover, the death penalty and its legal institutions inevitably construct
our cultural reality even as they reflect it. Sarat argues that “[s]tate killing
diminishes us by damaging our democracy, legitimating vengeance,
intensifying racial divisions, and distracting us from the challenges that the
new century poses for America.”19 Whether one agrees with these particular
conclusions or not, anyone seriously interested in wrestling with the question
of capital punishment must address the kinds of arguments Sarat raises and
consider carefully the many subtle effects of the death penalty on our society.
Thus, Sarat’s addition to the death penalty debate demonstrates the ways in
which a cultural analysis of law can generate both important descriptive
insights about our society and useful normative arguments about legal and
cultural reform.

Columbia Law Review) (documenting that Japan and United States are only industrialized nations
to retain death penalty). Indeed, the international community has frequently criticized the United
States for its stance regarding capital punishment, see, e.g., Elizabeth Olson, Good Friends Join
Enemies to Criticize U.S. on Rights, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1999, at A9 (describing European
disapproval of U.S. human rights abuses, including the death penalty, during annual U.N.
meeting), and our embrace of capital punishment may even threaten our foreign policy. See Brief
of Amici Curiae Diplomats Morton Abramowitz, Stephen W. Bosworth, Stuart E. Eizenstat, John
C. Kornblum, Phyllis E. Oakley, Thomas R. Pickering, Felix G. Rohatyn, J. Stapleton Roy, and
Frank G. Wisner in Support of Petitioner, McCarver v. North Carolina, 2001 WL 648607, at *12
(U.S. 2001) (No. 00-8727) (arguing on behalf of nine senior diplomats that imposing death
penalty on mentally retarded persons “will further the United States’ diplomatic isolation and
inevitably harm other United States foreign policy interests”); see also Raymond Bonner, Veteran
U.S. Envoys Seek End to Executions of Retarded, N.Y. Times, June 10, 2001, at A3 (“Nine . . .
diplomats say [imposing the death penalty on the mentally retarded] puts the United States at
odds with the rest of the world, creates diplomatic friction, especially with European allies,
tarnishes America’s image as the champion of human rights and harms broader American foreign
policy interests.”).
17. The most recent U.S. Department of Justice statistics indicate that, during 2001, sixtysix people were executed. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cp.htm (last visited April 9, 2002) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
18. Despite poll results indicating that support for capital punishment has slipped since its
peak in 1994, more than two-thirds of Americans surveyed in 2000 were in favor of the death
penalty. See Fox Butterfield, Death Sentences Being Overturned in 2 of 3 Appeals, N.Y. Times,
June 12, 2000, at A1; see also Samuel R. Gross, Update: American Public Opinion on the Death
Penalty—It’s Getting Personal, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1448, 1448 (1998) (finding that, as of 1998,
public support for death penalty remained at a near record high).
19. Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 250.
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I. CONTEXTUALIZING A CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF LAW
Sarat’s approach, which I have been calling a cultural analysis of law,
grows out of the tradition of sociolegal scholarship20 that extends from the
early days of legal realism in the first part of the twentieth century through the
founding of the Law and Society Association in the early 1960s.21 Broadly
speaking, the realist critique operated from the premise that legal doctrine is
inherently indeterminate, and therefore decisions about contested doctrinal
issues always are decided based on nondoctrinal factors.22 Law and society
research in the 1960s and 1970s extended the realist critique, pushing a
progressive agenda that sought to use law instrumentally to achieve
distributional justice.23 Nevertheless, although the legal realists and early law

20. Although one could view the cultural analysis of law as something wholly separate from
a sociological study of law, cf. Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal Realism?:
Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies, and the Situation of Legal Scholarship, 13 Yale J.L. &
Human. 3, 5 (2001) [hereinafter Sarat & Simon, Beyond Legal Realism?] (“One way to make
sense of this turn to culture is to relate it to the parallel decline of ‘the social’ . . . .”), I believe
such a rigid distinction is unhelpful, particularly given that an interest in the cultural analysis of
law largely developed out of the context of sociolegal scholarship and is now being advanced by
many of the same people who were leaders in the Law and Society movement, including Sarat
himself. Thus, I define a cultural analysis of law to include both more traditional sociological
approaches to legal study and the more recent constitutive approach I discuss infra. See also id. at
7 (“We see cultural analysis and cultural studies less as competitors against the multitude of
intellectual programs already operating in (what might be called) the post-realist legal
landscape . . . and more as valuable supplements to the altered environment of the present.”).
21. This brief discussion of the progression of twentieth century sociolegal scholarship
relies heavily on analyses cowritten by Sarat himself. See generally Bryant G. Garth & Austin
Sarat, Justice and Power in Law and Society Research: On the Contested Careers of Core
Concepts, in Justice and Power in Sociolegal Studies 1 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds.,
1998) [hereinafter Garth & Sarat, Justice and Power] (delineating ways in which ideas of justice
and power have been deployed in successive waves of sociolegal scholarship); Sarat & Simon,
Beyond Legal Realism?, supra note 20 (surveying intersection of cultural studies and law in
contemporary scholarship); Susan S. Silbey & Austin Sarat, Critical Traditions in Law and
Society Research, 21 Law & Soc’y Rev. 165, 167–72 (1987) [hereinafter Silbey & Sarat, Critical
Traditions] (discussing “epistemological foundations” and emergence of law and society
scholarship). For a particularly detailed overview of much of this scholarship, see generally
Jonathan Simon, Law After Society, 24 Law & Soc. Inquiry 143 (1999) (reviewing Stewart
Macaulay et al., Law and Society: Readings on the Social Study of Law (1995)). For a
discussion of twentieth century sociolegal scholarship as the ongoing elaboration of a
hermeneutics of suspicion, see generally Paul Schiff Berman, Telling a Less Suspicious Story:
Notes Toward a Non-Skeptical Approach to Legal/Cultural Analysis, 13 Yale J.L. & Human. 95,
106–18 (2001) [hereinafter Berman, Suspicious Story].
22. See William W. Fisher III, The Development of Modern American Legal Theory and
the Judicial Interpretation of the Bill of Rights, in A Culture of Rights: The Bill of Rights in
Philosophy, Politics, and Law—1791 and 1991, at 266, 270–71 (Michael J. Lacey & Knud
Haakonssen eds., 1991) (describing realist claim that legal doctrine has limited value). For useful
discussions of Legal Realism, see generally William W. Fisher III et al., American Legal Realism
(1993); Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927–1960 (1986).
23. Indeed, a commitment to distributional equality was in the background, if not the
foreground, of a number of pioneering law and society studies. See, e.g., David Caplovitz, The
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and society scholars challenged aspects of the legal order, they retained a faith
in the legal enterprise as a whole.24 “At this stage in the development of law
and society research, there was a taken-for-granted understanding of the nature
of justice and an unembarrassed commitment to the project of using social
research to promote justice through law.”25
Thus, scholars focused on the gap between “law on the books” and “law
in action” in order to suggest better ways of implementing a just legal order.
For example, an American Bar Foundation Survey of the Administration of
Criminal Justice in the 1950s and 1960s found that the exercise of discretion
among regulators and the police was one factor preventing the criminal justice
system from operating consistently with the progressive ideals being
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in that era.26 The focus, in this and
other “gap studies,” was to identify and explain deviations from the regulatory
ideal. However, “[i]mplicit in most of this research was the assumption that
the state regulatory policies, like the goals of the criminal justice system,
represented an appropriate starting point for a researcher strongly committed to
social justice.”27
Subsequent sociolegal scholars criticized these gap studies and “raised
questions about the ability of the liberal state, even in the best of times and
with the best intentions, to realize social justice.”28 In these works, law was
still seen in instrumental terms, but as a force that actually thwarts meaningful
reform. These scholars expressed “skepticism about the power of litigation to
promote social change, about claims of right generally, about the helpfulness
of due process hearings for welfare recipients, the usefulness of consumer
rights, the proliferation of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, and the

Poor Pay More: Consumer Practices of Low-Income Families 179–92 (1963) (summarizing
findings regarding consumer practices affecting low income people and suggesting various
reforms); Jerome E. Carlin et al., Civil Justice and the Poor, at ix (1966) (“Those of us who years
ago were concerned solely with what I might call orthodox issues of civil rights have, little by
little and for a time not fully realizing it, been dealing more and more with questions of
poverty . . . .”); Joel F. Handler, Social Movements and the Legal System: A Theory of Law
Reform and Social Change 191–233 (1978) (summarizing study of attempts by social movements
to use court action to achieve concrete changes); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law. & Soc’y Rev. 95, 135–51 (1974)
(suggesting reforms that might address systemic advantages of “repeat players” in civil justice
system over individuals or “one-shotters”).
24. See Silbey & Sarat, Critical Traditions, supra note 21, at 170.
25. Garth & Sarat, Justice and Power, supra note 21, at 4.
26. Id. at 4–5. The analysis of the results from the survey was published in five volumes:
Robert O. Dawson, Sentencing: The Decision as to Type, Length, and Conditions of Sentence
(1969); Wayne R. LaFave, Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect Into Custody (1965); Frank
W. Miller, Prosecution: The Decision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime (1969); Donald J.
Newman, Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial (1966); Lawrence
P. Tiffany et al., Detection of Crime: Stopping and Questioning, Search and Seizure,
Encouragement and Entrapment (1967).
27. Garth & Sarat, Justice and Power, supra note 21, at 5.
28. Id. at 6 (citations omitted).
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autonomy of the legal profession.”29 This period also saw the emergence of
critical legal studies scholarship30 challenging the classic doctrines of
American law and legal education, including contracts, torts, and corporations,
as well as antidiscrimination and labor law.31 Some analyses argued that
appeals to reason or principle are inevitably incoherent and that the resolution
of legal questions is therefore inherently political.32 Others focused on the
suppression of alternative values by dominant ideologies.33 Still others

29. Id. (citing Handler, supra note 23; John P. Heinz & Edward O. Laumann, Chicago
Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar (1982); Robert L. Nelson, Partners with Power: The
Social Transformation of the Large Law Firm (1988); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope:
Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (1991); Stuart A. Scheingold, The Politics of Rights:
Lawyers, Public Policy, and Political Change (1974); Richard L. Abel, The Contradictions of
Informal Justice, in 1 The Politics of Informal Justice 267 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982); Galanter,
supra note 23; Stewart Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 Law & Soc’y Rev.
115 (1979)).
30. For an overview of critical legal studies scholarship, see generally Mark Kelman, A
Guide to Critical Legal Studies 242–68 (1987); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36
Stan. L. Rev. 57 (1984); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96
Harv. L. Rev. 563 (1983).
31. Peter Gabel has provided a trenchant summary of this strand of critical scholarship.
Peter Gabel, Founding Father Knows Best: The Search by the Framed for the Intent of the
Framers, in The Bank Teller and Other Essays on the Politics of Meaning 139 (2000). According
to Gabel, critical legal scholars have argued that
there is no such thing as a distinctively “legal” way of deciding when workers have the right
to strike under the National Labor Relations Act, or whether industries that dump toxic wastes
into rivers and lakes are creating a “nuisance” giving rise to actions for money damages under
tort law. Since the law itself is always indeterminate in its application with a stock range of
arguments on all sides, Critical Legal Studies writers assert that the resolution of these issues
always requires frank political choices, that a legal argument is simply an opinion about the
right and wrong dressed up in an elite, technical discourse. The radical aim of this work is not
simply to show that all legal decisions are actually political decisions, but to undermine the
legitimacy of “legal reasoning” itself as a powerful symbol of cultural authority, a symbol that
tends—along with other such fetishized symbols as flags, black robes, and the elevated
judicial “bench”—to reinforce people’s passivity before imposing cultural institutions like the
Supreme Court, which is imagined to be the repository of a wisdom inaccessible to the
average person and the oracle of American political truth.
In alliance with the
deconstructionist work of Jacques Derrida and the related work of Michel Foucault on the
multiple ways that “official” forms of knowledge tend to crush people’s self-confidence and
sense of self-activity, this strand of critical legal scholarship means to expose “the law” as
basically a lot of posturing baloney, and to empower people to think and feel for themselves.
Id. at 140–41.
32. See generally, e.g., The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (David Kairys ed., rev.
ed. 1990) [hereinafter The Politics of Law] (collecting essays).
33. See generally, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97
Harv. L. Rev. 1276, 1276 (1984) (describing ways in which corporate and administrative law
naturalize bureaucratic power and ultimately erode democratic interaction); Mary Joe Frug, ReReading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 Am. U. L. Rev. 1065,
1074–1113 (1985) (examining how a classic contracts law casebook shapes ways in which
readers read the text and thereby obscures questions of gender relations); Duncan Kennedy, Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685, 1775 (1976) (arguing that
participants in the legal arena “who have mastered the language of form can dominate and
oppress others”).

313664.DOC

2002]

6/18/2002 10:12 AM

CULTURAL ANALYSIS

111

contended that legal education was an indoctrination of individuals into a
dominant elite.34 Finally, some critical scholars challenged assumptions
underlying communication itself by claiming that all meaning is ultimately
determined by the listener/reader.35
More recently, building on the work of Antonio Gramsci,36 Michel
Foucault,37 Michel de Certeau,38 and the vast, vaguely defined field of cultural
studies,39 sociolegal scholars have begun to engage in cultural analyses of law.
These studies take a constitutive, rather than an instrumental, approach to law,
focusing not on how law might serve progressive goals, but instead on how
law works within a society to help shape social relations.40 The constitutive
view of law sees legal discourse, categories, and procedures as a framework
through which individuals in society come to apprehend reality. Thus, law is
34. See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 30, at 184–85 (expressing concern that while many law
schools are sympathetic to progressive issues, legal education nevertheless implicitly encourages
students to “argue right-wing economistic politics, as if the case for a private property scheme
with considerable faith in undisturbed markets had been convincingly made”); Duncan Kennedy,
Legal Education As Training for Hierarchy, in The Politics of Law, supra note 32, at 38, 40
(observing that traditional law school classroom is “hierarchical with a vengeance” and therefore
indoctrinates students into a hierarchical system).
35. In 1988, Sanford Levinson and Steven Mailloux observed that, in light of “ambiguities
of interpretation, many legal theorists have substituted for the hermeneutics of objective
interpretation what Gerald Graff has termed a ‘hermeneutics of power,’ where one emphasizes
the political and social determinants of reading texts one way as opposed to another.”
Interpreting Law and Literature, at xiii (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988)
(quoting Gerald Graff, Textual Leftism, 49 Partisan Rev. 558, 566 (1982)).
36. See, e.g., Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci
245–46 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. & trans., 1971) (articulating a model of
hegemony); see also Susan S. Silbey, Making a Place for Cultural Analyses of Law, 17 Law &
Soc. Inquiry 39, 41 (1992) (“Working within a Gramscian framework, cultural analysts . . .
describe how discourses are produced, enacted, and reproduced.”).
37. See, e.g., Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings
1972–1977, at 142 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980) (describing power
relations as “interwoven with other kinds of relations (production, kinship, family, sexuality) for
which they play at once a conditioning and a conditioned role”). For a discussion of how
Foucault’s ideas are relevant to sociolegal research, see Silbey, supra note 36, at 39–41.
38. See, e.g., Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, at xiv (Steven F. Rendall
trans., 1984) (describing “popular procedures” or “ways of operating” by which ordinary people
“manipulate the mechanisms of discipline and conform to them only in order to evade them”); see
also Naomi Mezey, Out of the Ordinary: Law, Power, Culture, and the Commonplace, 26 Law.
& Soc. Inquiry 145, 147–48 (2001) (reviewing Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, The Common
Place of Law: Stories from Everyday Life (1998)) (describing de Certeau’s influence on
sociolegal scholars).
39. See, e.g., Mezey, supra note 38, at 151 (describing “cultural theory” as “that quirky, illdefined hash of insights from different disciplines”).
40. See Alan Hunt, Explorations in Law and Society: Toward a Constitutive Theory of Law
3 (1993) (describing constitutive theory as focusing “on the way in which law is implicated in
social practices, as an always potentially present dimension of social relations, while at the same
time reminding us that law is itself the product of the play and struggle of social relations”);
Silbey, supra note 36, at 41 (“[The] constitutive perspective . . . argues that law does more than
reflect or encode what is otherwise normatively constructed; in the constitutive perspective, law is
a part of the cultural processes that actively contribute in the composition of social relations.”).
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not merely a coercive force operating externally to affect behavior and social
relations; it is also a lens through which we view the world and actually
conduct social interaction. From this perspective, “law shapes society from the
inside out by providing the principal categories in terms of which social life is
made to seem largely natural, normal, cohesive, and coherent.”41 Clifford
Geertz perhaps provided a manifesto for the constitutive view in 1983:
[L]aw, rather than a mere technical add-on to a morally (or
immorally) finished society, is, along of course with a whole range
of other cultural realities . . . an active part of it. . . .
Law . . . is, in a word, constructive; in another constitutive; in a
third, formational.
....
. . . Law, with its power to place particular things that
happen . . . in a general frame in such a way that rules for the
principled management of them seem to arise naturally from the
essentials of their character, is rather more than a reflection of
received wisdom or a technology of dispute settlement. 42
Over the past fifteen to twenty years, sociolegal scholars have
increasingly embraced a constitutive vision of law43 and therefore have treated
law as: (1) a belief system that helps to define the roles of individuals within
society; (2) a system of organization that determines societal roles; and (3) a
language for conceptualizing reality, mediating social relations, and defining
41. Austin D. Sarat, Redirecting Legal Scholarship in Law Schools, 12 Yale J.L. & Human.
129, 134 (2000) [hereinafter Sarat, Redirecting Legal Scholarship] (reviewing Paul W. Kahn, The
Cultural Study of Law (1999)).
42. Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology 218,
230 (1983).
43. I realize, of course, that it is impossible to draw neat lines of division between
theoretical movements within an ongoing academic discourse. Thus, for example, although the
constitutive vision can be viewed as a perspective distinct from the primary concerns of critical
legal studies, one can also trace the articulation of the constitutive view to the work of some
critical legal studies scholars. See, e.g., Peter Gabel, The Bank Teller, in Gabel, supra note 31, at
21–24 (describing ways in which hierarchically arranged institutional roles, such as “bank teller,”
help to construct individual identity); Peter Gabel & Jay M. Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology,
in The Politics of Law, supra note 32, at 373, 373–74 (arguing that contract law constructs and
reinforces assumptions about individual autonomy and therefore impedes our ability to recognize
societal hierarchy); Gordon, supra note 30, at 103 (“[I]t is just about impossible to describe any
set of ‘basic’ social practices without describing the legal relations among the people involved—
legal relations that . . . define the constitutive terms of the relationship . . . .”). On the other hand,
as Sarat himself has elsewhere observed, one might also see considerable differences among
those who could be grouped together as taking the constitutive view. Sarat, Redirecting Legal
Scholarship, supra note 41, at 134 n.28. For example, Barbara Yngvesson’s study, Making Law
at the Doorway: The Clerk, the Court and the Construction of Community in a New England
Town, 22 Law & Soc’y Rev. 409, 443–46 (1988), in which she focuses on the way legal officials
construct the social understanding of ideas such as “good neighbor” or “dutiful parent,” seems
quite different from the argument of Gabel and Feinman that contract law tends to legitimate
oppressive socioeconomic realities by encoding particular conceptions of conflicts and
agreements. For Yngvesson, law has a relatively transparent effect on legal meaning, whereas for
Gabel and Feinman, the relationship between legal norms and social meaning is more submerged
and systematic.
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behavior. Following Geertz, they have deployed various interpretive methods
to study the “webs of signification”44 found within law, recognizing that
[w]e experience the rule of law not just when the policeman stops us
on the street or when we consult a lawyer on how to create a
corporation. The rule of law shapes our experience of meaning
everywhere and at all times. It is not alone in shaping meaning, but
it is rarely absent.45
Moreover, a cultural analysis of law also seeks to analyze legal
consciousness itself: the ways in which “legality is experienced and
understood by ordinary people as they engage, avoid, or resist the law and
legal meanings.”46 Thus, scholars have attempted to study law in “everyday
life.”47 Such studies ask: How do “commonplace transactions and
relationships come to assume or not assume a legal character? And in what
ways is legality constituted by these popular understandings, interpretations,
and enactments of law?”48 By emphasizing the everyday moments when
people negotiate their own understanding of legality, such scholarship seeks to
walk the fine line between liberal theory’s assumption of autonomous
individuals exerting free will in society, and structuralism’s conception of the
individual as determined by social and economic forces.49 Thus, this approach
operates as a critique not only of liberal conceptions of law (which tend to
view law as a self-contained system of rules), but also of many Marxist
critiques (which tend to view law as unidirectional, emanating from capitalist
class interests and entrenched elites). As one scholar has observed, from this
perspective the study of “legal consciousness is neither attitude nor
epiphenomenon, but cultural practice.”50
This brief history not only sets the context for When the State Kills, but

44. Geertz, Local Knowledge, supra note 42, at 182.
45. Kahn, supra note 9, at 124.
46. Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday
Life 35 (1998).
47. See, e.g., id. at xi (examining “the meanings of law in American lives,” including degree
to which Americans both use and resist law); Sally Engle Merry, Getting Justice and Getting
Even: Legal Consciousness among Working-Class Americans (1990) (studying one court in
eastern Massachusetts and observing way people use the court system to address everyday
personal problems); Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Editorial Introduction, in Law in
Everyday Life 1, 1 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993) (collecting essays that
“confront law in its dailiness and as a virtually invisible factor in social life”); Barbara
Yngvesson, Virtuous Citizens, Disruptive Subjects: Order and Complaint in a New England
Court 1–14 (1993) [hereinafter Yngvesson, Virtuous Citizens] (observing western Massachusetts
county court system to explore how complaints of citizens and responses of courts both reproduce
and challenge social hierarchies); Austin Sarat, “. . . The Law Is All Over”: Power, Resistance,
and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 Yale J.L. & Human. 343, 343 (1990)
[hereinafter Sarat, “. . . The Law Is All Over”] (interviewing welfare recipients and examining
“how people on welfare think about law and use legal ideas as well as how they respond to
problems with the welfare bureaucracy”).
48. Ewick & Silbey, supra note 46, at 33.
49. See Mezey, supra note 38, at 151 (citing Ewick & Silbey, supra note 46, at 35–38).
50. Id.
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also illuminates the four benefits of a cultural analysis of law that I articulated
previously. First, Sarat refuses to accept the rules articulated by elite judges
simply as autonomous legal acts. Instead, he insists that the production of
legal norms is a cultural practice replete with symbolic content. Second, he
seeks information about how legal norms are actually experienced and resisted
by ordinary people both in their literal encounters with the legal system and in
their everyday lives. Third, he understands that the narratives deployed in
official legal discourse reflect and reinforce broader cultural attitudes, beliefs,
and assumptions. Fourth, he recognizes that “law talk” is diffused throughout
the culture and that a proper study of law must address the dissemination of
legal consciousness in popular fora such as television and film. These
strategies inform and enliven Sarat’s study of capital punishment. The next
Part discusses each in turn.
II. FOUR BENEFITS OF CULTURAL ANALYSIS
When the State Kills is addressed to one particular topic: capital
punishment in the United States. Nevertheless, by analyzing both the kinds of
questions Sarat chooses to explore about the death penalty and the types of
insights he provides, I hope to identify four distinct benefits of his cultural
approach to legal study that are generalizable to nearly any legal issue. Thus, I
have chosen specific chapters of the book that illuminate each of these
benefits. Through my reading of these chapters, I argue that cultural analysis:
(1) encourages us to analyze the symbolic content of legal norms; (2) seeks
data on how legal norms are actually experienced and enacted by those
enmeshed in and affected by such norms; (3) suggests that we attend to the
importance of legal narratives; and (4) recognizes the role law plays in popular
culture. Moreover, I will suggest that each of these benefits not only helps
scholars to construct a richer descriptive understanding of the operation of law
in society, as Paul Kahn argues, but also contributes to doctrinally oriented
normative legal discourse.
A. Analyzing the Symbolic Content of Legal Norms
When the State Kills builds on David Garland’s observation that
“punishments . . . help shape the overarching culture and contribute to the
generation and regeneration of its terms.”51 Sarat takes seriously the idea that
punishment is not just the imposition of rules, but “a set of signifying practices
that ‘teaches, clarifies, dramatizes and authoritatively enacts some of the most
basic moral-political categories and distinctions which help shape our symbolic
universe.’”52 These practices have a pedagogical effect on society at large. As
Sarat notes, punishment “teaches us how to think about categories like

51. David Garland, Punishment and Culture: The Symbolic Dimension of Criminal Justice,
11 Studies in L. Pol. & Soc. 191, 193 (1991).
52. Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 23 (quoting Garland, supra note 51, at 195).
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intention, responsibility, and injury, and it models the socially appropriate
ways of responding to injuries done to us.”53
Accordingly, Sarat analyzes U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence not as
legal doctrine but as symbolic pedagogy. In so doing, he illuminates the ways
in which legal decisions both construct and reflect shifting cultural attitudes
toward crime and its impact on society. For example, Sarat compares the
Court’s decisions in Booth v. Maryland54 and Payne v. Tennessee,55 two cases
which, though decided only four years apart, came to opposite conclusions
concerning the use of victim-impact testimony in capital sentencing. But,
whereas a doctrinally oriented analysis might simply have discussed both
decisions and argued that one or the other was the “better” rule of law, Sarat
instead analyzes the change from one legal rule to the other as a reflection of
(and perhaps a catalyst for) changes in broader societal perceptions about the
appropriate role that the impulse for vengeance should play in the capital
sentencing process.
In the 1987 Booth decision, Justice Powell, writing for a five-four
majority, held that such testimony rendered the resulting death sentences of the
defendants unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.56 According to
Powell, victim-impact testimony, though emotionally compelling, created a
substantial risk of prejudice because such testimony could not contribute to an
assessment of the defendants’ “blameworthiness” and therefore was
irrelevant.57 Powell relied on the idea that the wrong done by the defendant is
different from the harm caused to the victim. In Powell’s view, because the
capital sentencing decision was appropriately based solely on whether the
wrong done was sufficiently egregious to warrant the death penalty, any focus
on the harm done to the victim or the victim’s family and friends would divert
the jury’s attention from the proper inquiry.58 In addition, Powell rejected
victim-impact statements because such emotional appeals might threaten to
overwhelm the “reasoned decisionmaking we require in capital cases.”59
Victim-impact statements, according to Powell, might “inflame the jury and
divert it from deciding the case on the relevant evidence. . . . As we have
noted, any decision to impose the death sentence must ‘be, and appear to be,
based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.’”60
As Sarat points out, Powell’s conclusion rests on several significant
assumptions about the nature of punishment itself. In particular, although
Powell does not say so explicitly, his opinion symbolically embraces the idea
that legal process should function as the rational superego that will restrain the

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
482 U.S. 496 (1987).
501 U.S. 808 (1991).
482 U.S. at 509.
Id. at 504.
See id. at 505.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 508 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (Stevens, J.)).
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id of passion, emotion, and vengeance.61 In this scheme, “Western legal
orders substitute the calm calculation of deterrence, the disciplining logic of
rehabilitation, and the stern but controlled authority of retribution for the
emotionalism of revenge.”62 As Sarat argues, drawing on the work of
philosopher Robert Nozick,63 revenge is personal, whereas state sanctioned
punishment is meant to be public and not based on a particular emotional
connection to the victim.64
Significantly, this transformation of private pain into public punishment is
precisely what the victims’ rights movement resists: “The goal of victims and
those who take up their cause is to repersonalize criminal justice so that the
sentencer has to declare an alliance with either the victim or the offender.
Criminal sentencing thus becomes a test of loyalty.”65 Sarat thereby recasts
the victims’ rights movement as a symbolic resistance to the rationalization of
state punishment and perhaps even a return to a (pre-modern?) conception of
punishment as private revenge. Indeed, he argues that the rubric of victims’
rights is “the latest ‘style’ in which vengeance has disguised itself.”66
From this perspective, Justice White’s dissent in Booth,67 which argued
that capital punishment should be based both on the harm caused to the victim
and the wrongfulness of the act committed by the defendant,68 was not merely
a doctrinal assertion. In addition, Sarat argues, White’s opinion symbolically
transformed the public punishment process into a vehicle for private vengeance
and facilitated “the breakdown of the categories of public and private” on
which the debate about punishment versus vengeance has traditionally
depended.69 Indeed, White’s position implied that a justice based on
impersonal abstract reason is not true justice at all. Instead, “the immediate,
concrete, and personal reality of pain and grief must be made comprehensible
to an audience of strangers through a complicated semiotic process.”70 Justice
Scalia, also in dissent,71 went farther still, basing his position in part on “an
outpouring of popular concern for what has come to be known as ‘victims’
rights.’”72 According to Scalia, “[m]any citizens” have found the criminal

61. See Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 39 (discussing contrast between
retribution and vengeance, the latter of which is conventionally conceived as “all id and no
superego”).
62. Id.
63. Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 366–68 (1981).
64. Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 41.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 43.
67. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 515 (1987) (White J., dissenting). Justice White’s
dissent was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Scalia.
68. Id. at 516–17 (White, J., dissenting).
69. Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 49.
70. Id.
71. Booth, 482 U.S. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia’s dissent was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and O’Connor.
72. Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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sentencing process one-sided.73 He argued that it was necessary for the jury to
hear “the full reality of human suffering the defendant has produced” because
that suffering is “one of the reasons society deems [the defendant’s] act worthy
of the prescribed penalty.”74 Thus, Scalia was content to allow a generalized
public sense of street justice to dictate the contours of the criminal justice
process itself. Whether one agrees or disagrees with this position, Sarat’s
analysis allows us to see that basing criminal sentencing on such an inchoate
sense of moral condemnation will inevitably erode the distinction between a
system of public justice and its vengeance based alternative.75
Four years later, in Payne, the Supreme Court reversed course and
embraced the view of Justices White and Scalia, signaling a cultural shift in
attitude regarding the criminal process as a vehicle for vengeance.76 Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a newly formed six-three majority,77 ruled both
that harm was indeed a relevant factor for consideration in the capital
sentencing process and that victim-impact testimony was a useful method of
informing the jury about such harm.78 According to the Court, this testimony
gives the jury a more complete picture of the “human cost of the crime of
which the defendant stands convicted.”79 Yet, as Sarat points out, “[f]ocusing
on that cost by hearing the voice of the victim personalizes death sentencing in
just the way revenge personalizes all punishment.”80 Thus, the language of the
majority opinion eroded the distinction between personal vengeance and state
punishment upon which Booth was based.
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence,81 echoing Justice Scalia’s reasoning in
his Booth opinion, noted a “strong societal consensus” in favor of victimimpact statements.82 Moreover, according to Justice O’Connor, even the
possibility that the statements might be “unduly inflammatory” did not mean
that they should be constitutionally prohibited.83 Rather, O’Connor argued
that murder “transforms a living person with hopes, dreams, and fears into a
corpse . . . . The Constitution does not preclude a State from deciding to give
some of that back.”84 Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist in his majority
opinion described victim-impact statements as providing “a quick glimpse of

73. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. See Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 50.
76. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
77. Id. at 810. The majority opinion was joined by Justices White, O’Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Souter.
78. Id. at 825–27.
79. Id. at 827.
80. Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 52.
81. Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor’s concurrence
was joined by Justices White and Kennedy.
82. Id. at 831 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
83. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 832 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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the life which a defendant chose to extinguish.”85
Sarat’s reading makes it clear that victim-impact evidence is deemed
valuable by these Justices precisely because it does not fit the abstract
impersonal model often associated with state-sanctioned punishment. Whereas
Oliver Wendell Holmes could say with confidence that law’s violence was
superior to “the greater evil of private retribution,”86 the current Supreme
Court appears not to share that confidence.87 Rather, Sarat argues, through
victim-impact testimony, “[t]he jury is asked to hear . . . pain and to avenge it,
to repay death with death to end the victimization. . . . [T]he return of
revenge . . . is now complete as the victim is given both a voice and a
champion.”88 According to Sarat, this return to revenge signals “a nagging
doubt that public processes can be built on anything but rage and grief,”89 and
therefore weakens the venerable idea that state violence should be more
disciplined and more accountable than private vengeance.90
Ultimately, Sarat does not explicitly state his preference for the Booth
rule, the Payne rule, or some other sentencing scheme (though he clearly
believes that state sanctioned criminal justice should be understood as a
process distinct from private vengeance).91 Indeed, his aim here is not to
determine which rule is preferable as a matter of legal doctrine, constitutional
history, or public policy. While such issues would almost certainly be the
focus of a more doctrinally oriented analysis, Sarat’s perspective is distinctly
different.
By closely reading the symbolic pedagogy of the Supreme Court
decisions in these two cases, Sarat illuminates a broader shift in cultural
attitudes toward crime that might otherwise be missed. As the Supreme
Court’s change from Booth to Payne indicates, the private desire for vengeance
felt by victims of violent crime is now the lens through which the death penalty
is viewed. Indeed, it is perhaps not surprising that one rarely hears the death
penalty even defended as a deterrent to criminal behavior anymore.92 The
85. Id. at 822 (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 38 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard
Univ. Press, Belknap Press 1963) (1881).
87. Indeed, Justice Scalia, in his Payne concurrence, specifically noted that Booth’s rule
barring victim-impact testimony “conflicts with a public sense of justice keen enough that it has
found voice in a nationwide ‘victims’ rights’ movement.” 501 U.S. at 834 (Scalia J., concurring).
As Sarat points out, Scalia positions himself as a spokesperson for the movement, and thereby
defines justice by a political, rather than an ethical, standard. Sarat, When the State Kills, supra
note 5, at 53.
88. Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 53.
89. Id. at 59.
90. See id. at 57; see also Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred 13–15 (Patrick Gregory
trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1977) (1972) (locating the root of modern systems of justice in
the fear of the unending chain of “reciprocal act[s] of vengeance”).
91. See Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 57.
92. Sarat quotes one scholar of crime and punishment in America who observes “a growing
sense that capital punishment no longer needs to be defended in terms of its social utility. . . . The
current invocation of vengeance reflects . . . a sense of entitlement to the death penalty as a
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arguments now are more likely to be based on society’s need to express its
condemnation of the accused93 or the healing impact the killer’s death might
have for the families of victims.94 Reading the relevant Supreme Court
opinions as cultural texts rather than just as legal doctrine illuminates this shift
in focus and therefore provides a greater understanding of cultural attitudes
that are worth studying in their own right. Such an analysis also suggests,
however, that arguments about the death penalty, in order to be effective, will
necessarily need to be recast in order to account for changes in the cultural
lens. Indeed, whatever one’s position on various criminal justice issues, the
terrain on which the battle for popular opinion is fought has changed in
fundamental ways over the past decade or so, and Sarat’s discussion suggests
some of those changes. Thus, his cultural analysis of Supreme Court doctrine
yields descriptive insight as well as cultural data that will inevitably inform
normative debates about criminal justice policy in America. In some sense,
Sarat appears to be saying that it is irrelevant whether a legal scholar thinks
Booth or Payne is the better reasoned position; more important is the cultural
zeitgeist those opinions both reflect and construct.
B. Providing Data on How Legal Norms are Actually Experienced and
Enacted
Legal scholars and policymakers have an unfortunate tendency to assume
that legal norms, once established, simply take effect and constitute a legal
regime.95 As Carol Weisbrod has observed, even theorists who position
themselves in opposition to prevailing legal norms tend to privilege official
legal pronouncements as the relevant site for locating (or changing) law.96
Such a perspective fails to recognize the ways in which legal norms are

satisfying personal experience for victims and a satisfying gesture for the rest of the community.”
Id. at 12 (quoting Jonathan Simon, Violence, Vengeance and Risk: Capital Punishment in the
Neo-Liberal State 13 (1997) (unpublished manuscript)).
93. See Donald L. Beschle, What’s Guilt (or Deterrence) Got to Do With It?: The Death
Penalty, Ritual, and Mimetic Violence, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 487, 536 (1997) (suggesting that
persistence of death penalty is attributable in part to society’s need for ritualized community
violence).
94. For example, just after the verdict was announced in the capital murder trial of Timothy
McVeigh, President Clinton hailed the verdict as a “long overdue day for the survivors and the
families of those who died in Oklahoma City.” Robert L. Jackson, Clinton Hails Verdict as
“Long Overdue,” L.A. Times, June 3, 1997, at A23 (internal quotation marks omitted). For an
argument that the impact on the defendant’s family should also be considered, see generally
Rachel King & Katherine Norgard, What About Our Families? Using the Impact on Death Row
Defendants’ Family Members as a Mitigating Factor in Death Penalty Sentencing Hearings, 26
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1119 (1999).
95. See, e.g., Joseph Tussman, Obligation and the Body Politic 73 (1960) (“Taking law as
central we develop theories of the state as a legal order or as the ‘rule of law.’”).
96. See Carol Weisbrod, Practical Polyphony: Theories of the State and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 985, 996 (1990) (“[F]eminist legal scholars, like others in legal
academic life, tend to address the powerful and to translate the question ‘What is to be Done?’
into the question ‘What should the State, acting through its judges, do?’” (citation omitted)).
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implemented, experienced, adapted, distorted, resisted, and subverted by the
very people whom the norm is meant to regulate. Indeed, “[l]aw is
continuously shaped and reshaped by the ways it is used, even as law’s
constitutive power constrains patterns of usage.”97 Accordingly, legal
actors—such as litigants, witnesses, and jurors—as well as legal subjects—
everyone from welfare recipients to home buyers to those seeking a marriage
certificate—all possess their own understandings of law; “they deploy and use
meanings strategically to advance interests and goals,”98 and these alternative
conceptions can ultimately prompt changes in “official” legal practices.99
Sociolegal scholars have made significant contributions over the past few
decades by studying the ways in which law operates not in its doctrinal purity,
but in the messy pluralism of “on the ground” application.100 Sarat employs
this strategy in When the State Kills by offering a lengthy description of the
attitudes and assumptions of jurors, culled from interviews, about the capital
sentencing process.101 His analysis is important both because he helps us to
understand how jurors reconcile themselves to participation in state violence,
and because he shows how the jurors’ own cultural assumptions about the legal
system may distort the capital sentencing process even on its own terms.
As Sarat notes, the jury’s role in capital punishment is often taken for
granted, but it is quite remarkable: “[O]rdinary citizens are regularly enlisted
as authorizing agents for the state’s own lethal brand of violence.”102 Indeed,
the mere fact that people would be able to impose death on another human
being in this context brings to mind Stanley Milgram’s famous social
psychology experiments about our capacity to inflict pain when we do so under
the cloak of official authority.103 These experiments reveal that, although we
may naturally hesitate to inflict pain or death on others, those inhibitions can
be overcome.104 Moreover, as studies from social and behavioral psychology
97. Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Beyond the Great Divide: Forms of Legal
Scholarship and Everyday Life, in Law in Everyday Life, supra note 47, at 21, 55. Of course, one
might say that juror behavior in capital cases does not actually exemplify “law in everyday life”
because jurors are necessarily working within the domain of state legal processes. Nevertheless,
Sarat’s analysis of juror attitudes is analogous because it shows how everyday “folk knowledge”
deployed even by those operating within the legal system can affect the application of legal
norms.
98. Sarat & Simon, Beyond Legal Realism?, supra note 20, at 20.
99. Recognizing this sort of feedback loop allows us to understand the “coexistence of
discipline and struggle, of subjection and subversion, and [to direct] attention toward[] a dynamic
analysis of what it means to be caught up in power.” Yngvesson, Virtuous Citizens, supra note
47, at 121.
100. See, e.g., supra note 47 (citing recent works of sociolegal scholarship).
101. See Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 153.
102. Id. at 127.
103. See Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View 113–15 (1974).
104. Milgram recruited subjects from a cross-section of the population by placing
advertisements in local newspapers inviting people to participate in a scientific study on learning
and memory. When individuals agreed to participate, the experimenter paired each subject with a
“learner,” who also appeared to be an experimental subject but who was in fact a confederate of
the experimenter. Id. at 16–18. Before beginning each session, the experimenter explained that
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indicate, “[p]ersons who act within social organizations that exercise authority
act violently without experiencing the normal inhibitions or the normal degree
of inhibition which regulates the behavior of those who act autonomously.”105
The changing legal/cultural attitudes about vengeance in criminal
sentencing discussed in the previous section may, over time, weaken jurors’
resistance to imposing death. Yet, in the death penalty context, the social
organization of the legal system itself also helps jurors to overcome any
inhibitions against violence they might feel106 by distancing them from a sense
of personal responsibility for the state killing. Sarat’s interviews with jurors
from a Georgia capital murder trial, at which the defendant had been sentenced
to death,107 suggest two ways in which this distancing occurs.
One obvious (though perhaps not sufficiently appreciated) factor is that
the jurors who authorize violence—like the judges and law clerks who later
review appeals—do not themselves inflict or even witness the imposition of
that violence. Thus, although the juror’s decision to impose a capital sentence
begins the process that may lead to death, the death itself seems far removed
from the verdict. As Sarat points out,
the juror’s language is performative. Yet jurors are encouraged to
think that it is not. Were they required to witness the full
consequences of their verdict or were they required to pull the switch
on those they condemn to death, the law would find it radically more
the “learner” would be asked to answer questions about paired words and instructed the subject to
administer electric shocks to the “learner” if the learner answered incorrectly. The experimenter
gave the subject a sample electric shock. During the session, the “learner” began to make
mistakes, and the experimenter instructed the subject to administer the electric shocks in
increasing levels of intensity. Id. at 22–23. In fact, the “learner” did not receive shocks at all, but
acted as if he did. See id. at 19. The machine that appeared to give the shocks bore a warning
that shocks above a certain level were dangerous. As the shock level increased, the “learner”
cried out in pain and begged the subject to stop. The experimenter, however, instructed the
subject to continue. Id. at 20–23. Twenty-six of the forty male subjects studied in the original
experiment administered shocks up to the highest level. Id. at 35. A subsequent study of forty
women yielded identical results. Id. at 61. The Milgram experiments are discussed and placed in
the context of a much larger body of experimental work and anecdotal material on
decisionmaking in Irving L. Janis & Leon Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of
Conflicts, Choice, and Commitment 268–71 (1977).
105. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601, 1615 (1986) (describing
work of Stanley Milgram, Anna Freud, and Konrad Lorenz).
106. As Robert Cover has observed, law itself would not be possible without such social
organization. See id. at 1613 (“Because legal interpretation is as a practice incomplete without
violence—because it depends upon the social practice of violence for its efficacy—it must be
related . . . to the cues that operate to bypass or suppress the psycho-social mechanisms that
usually inhibit people’s actions causing pain and death.”).
107. Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 137–54. These interviews were part of a
national study of jurors and the death penalty. See generally William J. Bowers & Benjamin D.
Steiner, Death by Default: An Empirical Demonstration of False and Forced Choices in Capital
Sentencing, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 605, 643–710 (1999) (presenting findings drawn from national study
based on three to four hour interviews with 916 jurors from 257 capital trials in eleven states).
Sarat chose four jurors randomly and interviewed them for two to five hours. Sarat, When the
State Kills, supra note 5, at 289 n.37.
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difficult to get their authorization to kill.108
Moreover, during the trial, although numerous crime scene photographs and
descriptions are used to bring the defendant’s crime to life, the jurors are given
no similarly visceral understanding of the violence that accompanies capital
punishment itself. As a result, jurors deliberate with a powerful sense of the
crime committed, but the reality of the state’s execution recedes far into the
background.
Small wonder then that, as the jurors Sarat interviewed discussed the case,
“vivid images of the scene of death and the violence that surrounded it were
most prominent in their recollections.”109 For example, one juror reported that
she did not want to look at the crime scene photographs, but that “[t]hey
insisted I had to look. . . . So I had to look, and that’s still following me into
that deliberating room.”110 Another juror could not even remember the name
of the defendant, but could describe the exact points on the body at which the
bullet entered and exited, a testament to the power of the crime scene evidence.
When asked if there was anything about the case that stuck in his mind, this
juror responded:
What I remember is seeing the pictures of the man laying behind the
counter, laying in a puddle of blood probably bigger than this table.
And the pictures—the other jurors and I had to . . . [i]t was difficult
for some of them to look at the pictures. They’d take them up so
close and they’d show the clear shots and all. Then we handled the
weapon and a lot of them really didn’t want to do that.111
Asked if he still thought about those pictures and the gun, this juror replied,
“Surely.”112 Perhaps most tellingly, a third juror acknowledged:
Normally I consider myself a liberal easterner transplanted here to
Georgia and against capital punishment—always was—but after I
saw that picture of that man, something popped. I saw the pictures
of him slumped down behind the counter and he was shot at
somewhere around here and behind the ear, that was terrible. . . . I
think about it even now and it bothers me very much.113
Thus, there can be little doubt that the crime scene evidence provided jurors
with a palpable emotional understanding of the defendant’s violence. In
contrast, as Sarat points out, “[n]o one showed jurors images of the scene of
the prospective execution, of the violence of electrocution. . . . No such images
were admissible or available for the juror eager to understand what he was
being asked to authorize.”114 As a result, jurors could identify with the pain
caused by the defendant’s killing and yet distance themselves from the reality
of the state’s killing or their role in it.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 135.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 139 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 141.
Id. at 138.
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Jurors may also distance themselves from their role in imposing the death
penalty by assuming that appellate review will always be available to
defendants, thereby rendering the jury verdict less significant. Indeed, as Sarat
points out, the U.S. Supreme Court itself has recognized this problem. In
Caldwell v. Mississippi,115 a prosecutor had told jurors that they should not
view themselves as finally determining whether the defendant would die
because any death sentence would automatically be reviewed on appeal.116
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, ruled that it was unconstitutional to
permit a death sentence in such a case.117 According to the Court, “the
uncorrected suggestion that the responsibility for any ultimate determination of
death will rest with others presents an intolerable danger that the jury will in
fact choose to minimize the importance of its role.”118 Moreover, the jurors,
freed from the weighty responsibility of feeling that they were actually
imposing death, might choose to “‘send a message’ of extreme disapproval for
the defendant’s acts,” even if the jurors were “unconvinced that death is the
appropriate punishment.”119
Nevertheless, even though the Supreme Court has clearly held that jurors
must fully understand their responsibility for imposing a death sentence,
Sarat’s interviews indicate that many of them continue to deny their role, often
based on their own (culturally influenced) impressions about the legal system.
Indeed, the jurors Sarat interviewed appear to have found it easier to vote for a
capital sentence precisely because they believed that the lengthy appeals
process and the possibility of reversal meant that their sentence would
probably never be carried out. One juror described the deliberations:
[W]e had to talk about the fact that this, just for the reason that we
voted for death, did not necessarily mean that [the defendant] would
die. . . . And I think we talked a good bit about the fact that this
would go to the Georgia Supreme Court and it would be reviewed
and that if anything was out of the ordinary then it would be thrown
out, and that even after then the man would have many opportunities
to appeal. And I think that probably that discussion helped more
than anything to persuade the two that was reluctant. Just because
we voted death didn’t mean he would die.120
Surprisingly, even though they voted for the death penalty, not one of the
jurors Sarat interviewed believed that the execution would actually be carried
out.121 As one juror put it: “We all pretty much knew that when you vote for
death you don’t necessarily or even usually get death. Ninety-nine percent of
the time they don’t put you to death. You sit on death row and get old.”122

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

472 U.S. 320 (1985).
Id. at 325–26.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 333.
Id. at 331.
Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 149.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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This kind of deflection of responsibility, of course, is precisely what
troubled the U.S. Supreme Court in Caldwell v. Mississippi. However, Sarat’s
analysis suggests that Caldwell’s prohibition of prosecutorial comments
regarding appeals may not have gone far enough. As Sarat points out, even if a
prosecutor does not explicitly tell the jurors about the appeals process,
“[i]nterviews with jurors across the country who have served in capital cases
suggest that they often come to court believing that the law grants excessive
and undue protections to defendants, which result in endless appeals in capital
cases.”123 Sarat quotes one juror who believed that those given the death
penalty “go back and appeal, appeal, appeal, so they die of old age.”124
Nevertheless, legal doctrine seems rarely to account for the fact that the
participants in the system often bring this sort of “folk knowledge” to their
application of legal norms.
Perhaps even more disturbing than the fact that capital jurors may be
distanced from their own responsibility for imposing a death sentence is
Sarat’s revelation that these jurors may actually vote for the death penalty even
if they do not believe it is warranted, simply because they want to ensure that
the defendant stays in prison for life. Sarat reports that the jurors he
interviewed “were overwhelmingly concerned with incapacitation as a goal of
criminal punishment.”125 Their principal aim was to make certain that the
defendant would never return to the streets of the town where the crime took
place. Yet, because at the time of trial Georgia law did not provide for a
sentence of life without parole, the jurors believed that voting for death was the
only way to accomplish this purpose. As one juror explained,
[i]f he had not been found guilty of capital murder he would have
gotten life. But that doesn’t mean that he would have served a life
term. It means he would have gotten out in however many years it is
you have to serve before you get out on parole. Isn’t it something
like seven years. I think I’m just going by what I hear on TV, you
know.126
Two other jurors similarly reported that they would have preferred voting for
life in prison without possibility of parole, but they chose death because this
alternative was not available.127 Thus, juror perceptions that the parole
process is overly lenient may actually result in more death sentences being
imposed.
Yet, as Sarat points out, although this perception of parole leniency is
widespread,128 it tends to reflect the distortions of media misinformation and
123. Id.
124. Id. at 149–50 (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. Id. at 147.
126. Id. at 148 (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 151 (describing as “cultural common sense” the idea that courts do not punish
severely or effectively enough and that prisons release incarcerated offenders too soon). His
impression seems to be borne out by more quantitative analyses. See, e.g., Julian Roberts, Crime,
Criminal Justice, and Public Opinion, in The Handbook of Crime and Punishment 31–57
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political rhetoric, rather than actual practice. For example, he notes that,
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the media in Georgia regularly reported that
murderers not given the death penalty would be eligible for parole within
seven years.129 However, from 1985 to 1994, the Georgia State Parole Board
policy was that persons sentenced to life for capital crimes would be
considered for parole only after fifteen years,130 and since 1993 state
legislation provides that a person accused of capital murder and sentenced to
life in prison without parole “shall not be eligible for any form of parole during
such person’s natural life” absent a finding of factual innocence.131 On a
national level, Sarat cites the infamous Willie Horton advertisements during
the 1988 presidential campaign as “the most striking example” of this
emotionally laden rhetoric.132 The ads, which created a “narrative nightmare”
of a killer released from prison who kills again has, Sarat argues, “provided the
bedrock for both political rhetoric and the consciousness of crime and
punishment ever since.”133 It is not surprising, therefore, that the jurors in the
Georgia case described by Sarat reacted against their perception that prison
inmates receive “undue solicitude”134 and viewed a death sentence as the only
viable option.
Taken as a whole, Sarat’s interviews provide useful cultural insights about
the way in which jurors actually receive, reinterpret, and refashion legal norms.
These insights demonstrate some of the ways in which “law” resides in cultural
attitudes as well as official legal practice. Thus, judges, legislators, and legal
scholars cannot assume that legal doctrine simply imposes a rule that is selfexecuting. Rather, law is a multivocal conversation, and the official
pronouncement, though powerful and coercive, is not the only voice to be
heard.
Moreover, listening to the voices of jurors, as reflected in Sarat’s
interviews, suggests several concrete ways in which official legal practice
might respond so that the imposition of the death penalty might at least
embody the community sentiment it purports to reflect. First, jurors might be
permitted (or required) to view photographs or movies documenting actual
executions or to hear testimony from people who have witnessed the death
penalty in practice. This evidence might help jurors to gain a visceral sense of

(Michael Tonry ed., 1998) (describing more than three decades of research indicating that public
sees courts as too lenient).
129. Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 151.
130. Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror Misperceptions
Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 211, 227
n.48 (1987). In addition, the general percentage of those considered for parole who were actually
set free was infinitesimal. See, e.g., id. at 229 n.53 (noting that offenders sentenced to life for
noncapital murder were eligible for parole in seven years, but fewer than one percent were
actually released).
131. Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-16 (1997).
132. Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 152.
133. Id.
134. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the consequences resulting from their sentence. Likewise, judges and law
clerks involved in the administration of the death penalty might also be
encouraged to see such evidence or even witness an execution.135 Second,
jurors might be informed of the relatively low percentage of capital cases that
are actually reversed on appeal,136 so that they will be less able to avoid taking
responsibility for sentencing another human being to die. Third, the U.S.
Supreme Court might expand the rule enunciated in Simmons v. South
Carolina.137 Simmons held that, where the defendant’s future dangerousness
is at issue and state law prohibits the defendant’s release on parole, due process
requires that defense counsel be permitted to inform the jury that the defendant
would not be eligible for parole if sentenced to life in prison.138 As Justices
Souter and Stevens pointed out in concurrence, however, “on matters of law,
arguments of counsel do not effectively substitute for statements by the
court.”139 These justices argued that it was the trial court’s responsibility to
inform the jury regarding parole ineligibility,140 and two more recent Supreme
Court decisions also emphasize the importance of the judge’s instructions.141
In light of the deeply ingrained cultural assumptions about parole that Sarat’s
data reveals, this argument is particularly compelling.142

135. Alternatively, televising executions might result in greater public consciousness of
state killing. Sarat discusses this issue elsewhere in the book. Sarat, When the State Kills, supra
note 5, at 187–208. For a discussion of this argument, see infra text accompanying notes 206–
210.
136. A recent study of decisions by twenty-six state high courts from 1990 to 1999 found
that the overall capital conviction reversal rate was approximately 27%, and that of those
reversals, only 39% were conviction reversals, while 61% reversed the sentence only. Moreover,
this study considered only those cases that were actually reviewed on appeal; it did not count
cases in which no appeals were filed in the state’s highest court. See Latzer & Cauthen, supra
note 7, at 65–67.
137. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
138. Id. at 156 (plurality opinion); id. at 172 (Souter, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 173 (Souter, J., concurring).
140. Id. (Souter J., concurring).
141. See Kelly v. South Carolina, 122 S. Ct. 726, 729–34 (2002) (stating that, at least when
defendant’s “future dangerousness” is put at issue during sentencing phase, statements by defense
counsel were “inadequate to convey a clear understanding” of parole ineligibility); Shafer v.
South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 52–54 (2001) (rejecting argument that defense counsel’s statements
at sentencing phase, coupled with trial court instructions that “life imprisonment means until the
death of the defendant,” were sufficient to satisfy Simmons).
142. Recently, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, has also
signaled a willingness to extend Simmons and require that jurors be informed about parole
eligibility in all death penalty cases, not just those in which life without parole is an available
option. See Brown v. Texas, 522 U.S. 940, 940–42 (1997) (opinion of Stevens, J., respecting the
denial of the petition for writ of certiorari). These justices suggested that jurors should be told,
for example, that under state law a defendant sentenced to life in prison would be incarcerated for
thirty-five years before he would be eligible for parole. See id. at 941 (arguing that Texas law
prohibiting defense counsel from conveying such truthful information to jury is in “obvious
tension” with Simmons).
Indeed, testifying to the pragmatic value of “on the ground” information in this area, these
justices extensively cited empirical data showing that support for the death penalty decreases
substantially if respondents are offered an alternative of life without parole for at least twenty-five
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Thus, sociological research like Sarat’s serves a dual role. First, his
interviews provide particularly compelling evidence that the structure of the
capital sentencing process and the effect of deeply held cultural beliefs can
affect how easily jurors reconcile themselves with imposing a death sentence.
Second, his data create a context for pursuing specific legal and policy
reforms. By analyzing the way in which legal rules actually operate on the
ground, we may come to understand better the complex ways in which
individuals actually experience, use, and reinterpret legal norms. We may also
see that legal institutions must respond to this “user” feedback and not just
assume that law is always implemented in the pure form that the study of
doctrine might lead us to believe.
C. Studying the Role of Legal Narratives
Philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey wrote that “reality only exists for us in the
facts of consciousness given by inner experience.”143 For every experience,
however, a wide range of possible meanings can be assigned. And for every
possible meaning there is a range of stories we can tell. As anthropologist
Edward Bruner has pointed out, “[i]f we write or tell about the French
Revolution, for example, we must decide where to begin and where to end,
which is not so easy, so that by our arbitrary construction of beginnings and
endings we establish limits, frame the experience, and thereby construct it.”144
Accordingly, “[e]very telling is an arbitrary imposition of meaning on the flow
of memory . . . every telling is interpretive.”145
Legal scholarship has sometimes implicitly rejected this insight, focusing
instead on the ideals of objectivity,146 neutrality,147 and noncontextualized

years. See id. at 941 n.2 (citing William J. Bowers, et al., A New Look at Public Opinion on
Capital Punishment: What Citizens and Legislators Prefer, 22 Am. J. Crim. L. 77 (1994)). This
data is striking. For example, “[i]n Nebraska . . . although 80.4% of people support capital
punishment in the abstract, only 51.6% prefer the death penalty when the alternative is life
imprisonment when the defendant would be ineligible for parole for 25 years.” Id. (citing Bowers
et al., supra, at 105). In addition, support for the death penalty dropped in each state when life
imprisonment was presented as an alternative and the defendant would be parole ineligible for
twenty-five years. See id. (stating that “support for death penalty dropped from 77% to 62% in
Arkansas, from 64% to 45% in Virginia, and from 75% to 53% in Georgia” in such circumstances
(citing Bowers et al., supra, at 89–90)). Not surprisingly, the death penalty becomes even less
attractive as the length of parole ineligibility increases. See id. (“While 51.6% of people in
Nebraska prefer the death penalty when the alternative is life imprisonment when defendant
would be parole ineligible for 25 years, only 46.4% prefer the death penalty when defendant
would be parole ineligible for 40 years.” (citing Bowers et al., supra, at 105)).
143. Wilhelm Dilthey, An Introduction to the Human Studies, in Selected Writings 159, 161
(H.P. Rickman ed. & trans., 1976).
144. Edward M. Bruner, Experience and Its Expressions, in The Anthropology of
Experience 3, 7 (Victor W. Turner & Edward M. Bruner eds., 1986).
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., H. Richard Uviller, The Advocate, The Truth, and Judicial Hackles: A
Reaction to Judge Frankel’s Idea, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1067, 1067 (1975) (“[I]t seems to me that
properly directed and purged of obvious abuses, the juxtaposition of two contrary perspectives,
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theory.148 Such a focus can result in an emphasis on impersonal abstractions
rather than particular voices and dramas.149 Nevertheless, echoing the work of
literary critics, anthropologists, sociologists, and others,150 interdisciplinary
the impact of challenge and counter-proof, often discloses to a neutral intelligence the most likely
structure of Truth.”); see also Alexander Welsh, Strong Representations: Narrative and
Circumstantial Evidence in England 10 (1992) (“For the past two hundred years, irrespective of
their differences, Anglo-American and Continental courts of law have put primary emphasis on
true representations of the facts.”).
147. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 309–10 (1980)
(“[C]itizens of a liberal state have more than the right to complain in court when others frustrate
their desires. They have a right to relief when their fellows prove incapable of justifying their
power through Neutral dialogue.”); id. at 10–12 (discussing desirability of neutrality); see also
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959)
(advocating that decisions should be based on preexisting neutral principles rather than on
outcomes).
148. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 116–17 (1977) (describing ideal
judge as one who “must construct a scheme of abstract and concrete principles that provides a
coherent justification for all common law precedents and, so far as these are to be justified on
principle, constitutional and statutory provisions as well”); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 13
(1971) (“Justice as fairness begins . . . with one of the most general of all choices which persons
might make together, namely, with the choice of the first principles of a conception of justice
which is to regulate all subsequent criticism and reform of institutions.”).
149. See Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 Vt. L. Rev.
681, 682 (1994) [hereinafter Sherwin, Narrative Construction] (“In legal academia, impersonal
abstractions rather than particular voices and dramas have ruled the day.”).
150. See generally, e.g., The Anthropology of Experience, supra note 144 (collecting essays
exploring relationship between experience and narratives used to describe experience); Roland
Barthes, Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives, in Image—Music—Text 79
(Stephen Heath trans., 1977) (using linguistics to construct, describe, and classify a theory of
narratives); Vincent Crapanzano, Tuhami: Portrait of a Moroccan (1980) (exploring conflicting
storytelling styles between anthropologist and subject); Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology
(Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1974) (1967) (drawing on work
of linguist Ferdinand de Saussure to argue that language provides no direct access to reality and
therefore what we call “reality” is a set of narrative conventions); Claude Levi-Strauss, The
Effectiveness of Symbols, in Structural Anthropology 186, 197–204 (Claire Jacobson & Brooke
Grundfest Schoepf trans., Basic Books 1963) (1958) (describing use of narratives to encapsulate
pain); Renato Rosaldo, Culture and Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis 21 (1989)
(advocating that social science acknowledge the role of conflicting narratives and subjectivity in
descriptions of reality); Peter Brooks, The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in Law’s Stories 14, 14
(Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (“Narrative appears to be one of our large, allpervasive ways of organizing and speaking the world—the way we make sense of meanings that
unfold in and through time.”); Hayden White, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of
Reality, in On Narrative 1, 2 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1981) (“[N]arrative is a metacode, a human
universal on the basis of which transcultural messages about the nature of a shared reality can be
transmitted.”); see also Jerome Bruner, Acts of Meaning, at xii (1990) (describing ways in which
narratives shape experience and proposing to examine “the nature and cultural shaping of
meaning-making, and the central place it plays in human action”); Reid Hastie et al., Inside the
Jury 6–14 (1983) (first examining how jurors construct meaning and then developing a
framework to study jurors’ decisionmaking processes, in order to “reduce the dependence of legal
policy makers on the vagaries of intuition and personal experience”); Merry, supra note 47, at
110–33 (exploring “the way meanings are raised and contested during discussions of conflict
situations within the court . . . [and] the way parties argue about meanings and about frames of
meaning”); Simon Schama, Dead Certainties 322 (1991) (using historical novella genre to

313664.DOC

2002]

6/18/2002 10:12 AM

CULTURAL ANALYSIS

129

legal scholars have in recent years increasingly studied the role of narratives in
structuring our experience of the world.151

illustrate how “claims for historical knowledge must always be fatally circumscribed by the
character and prejudices of its narrator”); Richard A. Shweder, Thinking Through Cultures:
Expeditions in Cultural Psychology 1–23 (1991) (using anthropological and psychological
analysis to envision the world through narrative structures and study diverse ways of “thinking
through cultures”); Donald P. Spence, Narrative Smoothing and Clinical Wisdom, in Narrative
Psychology: The Storied Nature of Human Conduct 211, 211–32 (Theodore R. Sarbin ed., 1986)
(using Freud’s analysis of Dora to examine narrative constructs); Barbara Yngvesson, Reexamining Continuing Relations and the Law, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 623, 645 (1985) (arguing that
“law and other forms of normative order” are not static identities, but instead “shape, and are
shaped by, continuing relationships”).
151. See, e.g., Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Literary Criticisms of Law 23, 201–91
(2000) (arguing that “the value of the narrative criticism of law lies not in invoking some abstract
idea of narrative to challenge law, but in examining, critiquing, and revising the particular
narratives embedded in law, and the identities and institutions these narratives enable”); Rebecca
Redwood French, The Golden Yoke: The Legal Cosmology of Buddhist Tibet (1995) (detailing
legal narratives of Buddhist Tibet as reflecting entire cosmology that derives from broader
cultural/spiritual understandings); Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion,
Exclusion, and American Law (1990) (challenging narrative categories that tend to be assumed in
legal analysis); Robin West, Narrative, Authority, and Law (1993) [hereinafter West, Narrative]
(arguing that jurisprudence is a form of narrative and should be read for its literary attempts to
articulate meaning); James Boyd White, Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal
Criticism (1990) [hereinafter White, Justice as Translation] (arguing that justice requires
recognition of multiple points of view); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 Cal. L.
Rev. 971, 982 (1991) (examining “feminist narrative scholarship as a distinctive form of legal
argument”); Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Things: Anthropological Approaches to
Law and Society in Conditions of Globalization, 10 Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 791, 792 (1995)
(engaging in anthropological analysis to study storytelling and arguing that “the representation of
law in contexts shaped by global flows of people, capital, information, imagery, and goods
demands new forms of scholarly representation”); Anne M. Coughlin, Regulating the Self:
Autobiographical Performances in Outsider Scholarship, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1229 (1995) (comparing
discourse of autobiography to discourse of law, and contending that both types of narrative are
nuanced and complex); Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 4
(1983) (arguing that “[n]o set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives
that locate it and give it meaning”); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of
School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 807, 808 (1993) (providing overview of
“legal storytelling,” and investigating role of stories in legal studies); Jane B. Baron, Resistance
to Stories, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 255, 256, 285 (1994) (contending that Farber and Sherry “miss the
point of the storytelling movement,” arguing that what people perceive as “mainstream, ordinary,
and conventional [storytelling] standards” are social constructs, and concluding that the
storytelling movement must “clarify[] its own claims about truth”); Rebecca R. French, Of
Narrative in Law and Anthropology, 30 Law & Soc’y Rev. 417, 418 (1996) (comparing use of
narrative in disciplines of law and anthropology); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom:
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323, 324 (1987) (examining
development of racial exclusion and racial distinctiveness theories, and contending that victims of
racial discrimination speak with a unique voice that warrants more serious attention); Kim Lane
Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma’am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision of
Truth, 37 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 123 (1992) (examining Anita Hill testimony and stories from
abused women, and observing that traditional modes of storytelling fail to appreciate role of
silence, revisions, and counterstories); Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 Mich.
L. Rev. 2073, 2073, 2098 (1989) (introducing symposium issue focused on storytelling and law,
and arguing that because courts provide arena for pluralistic voices and stories, they may protect
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One part of this focus on narrative has been the study of legal storytelling.
Early work by James Boyd White used the tools of literary criticism to analyze
More recently, scholars have borrowed from
appellate decisions.152
neurobiology and cognitive psychology to explore how stories shape the ways
in which legal decisionmakers process information or conceptualize truth.153
Still others have analyzed lawyers’ use of rhetoric and narrative in the
courtroom.154 All of these studies ask questions that had not previously been
the subject of legal discourse. Among those questions are:
How does a story trigger our narratival expectations, leading us to
the familiar site of a known genre? How does the story exploit our
world knowledge—the numerous and varied cultural scripts,
schemata, and stereotypes, that we carry around in our heads? How
does the story make use of shapeshifting mood devices . . . which
alter the action of the verb from a fait accompli (the historical fact of
the matter) to an action that is psychologically in process (what we
might call the contingent or subjunctive mode)? Or consider: How
countermajoritarian interests); Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2073 (1989)
(collecting essays on law and narrative); James Boyd White, Law as Language: Reading Law
and Reading Literature, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 415 (1982) [hereinafter White, Law as Language]
(comparing literary and legal analysis of texts).
152. See generally, e.g., White, Justice as Translation, supra note 151, at ix–xvii; White,
Law as Language, supra note 151, at 415–19, 425–26.
153. See generally, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam & Jerome Bruner, Minding the Law 1–8
(2000) (examining the way in which cognitive processes of categorization and narrative
construction affect legal reasoning); Steven L. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and
Mind, at xi–xvii (2001) (applying advances in cognitive theory to law).
154. See, e.g., W. Lance Bennett & Martha S. Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the
Courtroom: Justice and Judgment in American Culture, at ix (1981) (exploring how bias in trials
may result from different modes of telling and listening to stories); Bernard S. Jackson, Law, Fact
and Narrative Coherence 1 (1988) (examining how structural semiotics and “narrative coherence”
affect how legal actors perceive facts and law); Law’s Stories, supra note 150 (compiling twentyone essays examining narrative, rhetoric, and law); Richard K. Sherwin, When Law Goes Pop:
The Vanishing Line Between Law and Popular Culture, at ix–x (2000) (urging readers to heed
carefully “the legal implications of significant shifts in our storytelling practices”); Anthony G.
Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Arguments to a Jury, 37 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev.
55, 55–58 (1992) (analyzing storytelling techniques, narratives, and “dialogic structure” in
attorneys’ closing arguments); Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at
the Trial of Klaus Barbie, 98 Yale L.J. 1321, 1321–24 (1989) (describing various narratives at
play in French trial of accused Nazi war criminal Klaus Barbie); Robert A. Ferguson, Becoming
American: High Treason and Low Invective in the Republic of Laws, in The Rhetoric of Law
103, 103–05 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1994) (discussing underlying narratives of
treason trials in early America); Richard K. Sherwin, Lawyering Theory: An Overview: What
We Talk About When We Talk About Law, 37 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 9, 20 (1992) (arguing for
cultural approach to legal analysis, which calls into question “taken-for-granted models,
prototypes, schemas, or images of self, others, and social institutions that make up particular
social domains and legal practices”); Sherwin, Narrative Construction, supra note 149, at 687
(examining legal briefs submitted to Supreme Court to consider “how particular story elements
can be used to shape and inform the meaning of a particular legal reality”); Symposium, Lawyers
as Storytellers & Storytellers as Lawyers: An Interdisciplinary Symposium Exploring the Use of
Storytelling in the Practice of Law, 18 Vt. L. Rev. 567 (1994) (collecting essays on legal
storytelling).
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do story structure and character-typing interact with narrative
composition and genre selection in the creation of meaning?155
In When the State Kills, Sarat does not attempt a comprehensive analysis
of any of these questions. Nevertheless, he does explore some of the typical
narratives employed by lawyers in capital trials and attempts to link those
narratives to broader cultural attitudes about crime, violence, free will, and
personal responsibility. As such, he shows how a cultural analysis of law, with
its embrace of interdisciplinary approaches (such as the study of narratives),
can illuminate the ways in which legal proceedings and larger cultural attitudes
both reflect and reinforce each other. Moreover, Sarat not only provides a
series of useful insights regarding the social role of legal proceedings, he also
uses his analysis of narrative to suggest a rationale for opposing capital
punishment that might otherwise escape attention.
Sarat offers his own eyewitness account of a Georgia capital trial
involving an African American male, William Brooks, who was accused of
raping and murdering a white woman, Carol Jeannine Galloway.156 He reports
that at the Brooks trial, as at most capital trials, two archetypal narratives were
fighting for prominence. The prosecution attempted to “turn[] crime and
punishment into a simplifying and reassuring story of individual responsibility,
of evil people doing evil deeds and calling down upon themselves a just and
inevitable punishment.”157 In contrast, the defense, “while not denying that
individuals can and should be held responsible, trie[d] to contextualize [the]
crime by focusing on the social conditions that [brought] it about.”158
Significantly, both sides attempted to conceptualize their “protagonist” as a
victim whom jurors should view with sympathy. The prosecution’s tale
focused on a figure of perfect innocence, “injured by [a] crime”; the defense, in
contrast, constructed a portrait of an unfortunate criminal, injured by a “tragic
life.”159 Thus, both sides invoked “stock characterizations to create
sympathetic identification.”160
Although the prosecutor in the Brooks case denied the significance of
race, saying the case was not about “black versus white,”161 the racial
component of this rape/murder hovered over the trial from the start. Moreover,
Sarat reports that, despite the prosecutor’s disclaimer, much of the imagery he
relied upon was racially tinged, “as in his repeated claim that Brooks had led
his life in ‘dark places.’”162 Meanwhile, the prosecution presented Galloway
as “the body of mankind”163 and constructed a narrative attesting to the
155. Sherwin, Narrative Construction, supra note 149, at 686–87.
156. See Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 87–125. For another account of the
same case, see William S. McFeely, Proximity to Death 84–124, 143–82 (2000).
157. Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 88.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 93.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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innocence and purity of that body. For example, the victim was portrayed as a
“child” in the bosom of a loving family, despite the fact that she was twentythree years old at the time of her death.164 In addition, the prosecution was
able to have Galloway’s virginity entered into evidence (on the ground that it
was relevant to the issue of whether she had consented to have sex with
Brooks); her virginity then became, in Sarat’s words, “the unsubtle symbol of
her innocence and worth, and Brooks’s crime became an incorporation of the
stereotypical racial attack on white womanhood.”165
The prosecution sought to portray Brooks as evil incarnate, in
juxtaposition to Galloway’s purity and innocence. Brooks was depicted as an
individual of free will choosing to inflict immoral, predatory violence on
innocence itself.166 In the words of the prosecutor, “One thing keeps coming
back. It was all so unnecessary. If one person hadn’t decided to use another
for his lust she would still be alive. This is not the age of disposable
people.”167 Thus, as Sarat describes it, the prosecution invited jurors “to see
Brooks and his act as ‘inexplicably alien, horrendous and inhuman.’”168
The defense, in contrast, told a story of a random, chaotic universe where
inexplicable events simply happen, and no one can be held responsible.169
The key to this story was Brooks’s own confession, in which he said that after
he and Galloway engaged in sexual intercourse the victim started screaming.
He pointed the gun at her, cocked it, and then “it went off.”170 The defense
insisted that the statement should be taken literally and offered testimony
indicating that the gun used by the defendant might indeed have discharged
accidentally.171 Thus, in place of the prosecution’s narrative about free will
and personal agency, the defense constructed the gun as the agent of death.
Later, at the penalty phase, the defense offered a story of Brooks as a
victim to parallel the prosecution’s earlier story about Galloway. Indeed, the
defense story constructed Brooks as an innocent child, victimized by a
physically abusive stepfather,172 just as the prosecution had portrayed
Galloway as a virgin child victimized by the defendant. Yet, as Sarat
describes, “[i]n contrast to the direct, personal, decontextualized violence” of
the crime, “the defendant’s life story was marked by a more diffuse, systemic

164. Id. at 94.
165. Id. at 97.
166. See id. at 105.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 106 (quoting West, Narrative, supra note 151, at 175).
169. See id. at 105.
170. Id. at 99.
171. Id. at 103–04.
172. See id. at 111–12. The story of this systemic violence also reveals law’s failure to
ensure a safe society, particularly for African Americans. See id. at 113 (“Like many other young
black men, Brooks lived beyond law’s protection and suffered pitifully for doing so. Looming
over this story is the specter of violence generating violence, aided and abetted by law’s inability
to provide protection or defense.”).
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violence, spread over a longer period of time.”173 While acknowledging that
this systemic violence could not excuse the defendant’s crime, the defense
argued that the story of the defendant’s life was a reason for showing
“Christian[] . . . mercy and compassion.”174
This effort to portray the defendant as a victim provoked a paradigmatic
clash between two narratives that are at the core of cultural discussions about
crime in America. The defense offered what Sarat calls a “high-culture,
scientific-discourse explanation” portraying the defendant’s behavior as
“complex and hard to disentangle from the violence he had experienced.”175
In contrast, the prosecution provided a “low-culture, commonsense
rendering”176 that focused on individual free will and personal responsibility.
The prosecutor’s cross-examination of a social worker who had testified about
the defendant’s upbringing provides a particularly good example of this clash:
Q: Do you believe that God gave us the capacity to choose
right from wrong?
A: Yes, that can happen if one has a nurturing environment that
would support that capacity and allow it to be used.
....
Q: How do you explain why some people who come from bad
homes do well in life?
A: We all have different innate endowments and ability to
tolerate frustration. One can’t just look at people and know who will
turn out good and who will turn out bad. You have to look carefully
at the environment and especially at family dynamics.
Q: Are you saying that people are not responsible for what they
do?177
In this exchange, we can hear the familiar, even clichéd, dialogue that has been
at the heart of American discussion of criminal justice issues for decades.
Through his study of these trial narratives, Sarat suggests that the
destructive impact of the death penalty cuts deeper than simply the state’s
murder of a human being. In addition, prosecutors, on behalf of the state,
reinforce “a sociologically simple world of good and evil, and a morally clear
world of responsibility and desert.”178 Thus, “[i]nstead of confronting
complex social problems, we are invited to see them in stark and simple
terms.”179 Defense narratives, while attempting to complicate the sociological
portrait, nevertheless tend to adopt the same convention of focusing on a
victim who deserves our individualized mercy and compassion. Yet,
“[d]efending a murderer like Brooks requires the construction of a more
complex narrative of causation and accident, of mixed lives and mixed
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 107.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 113.
Id.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 123.
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motives.”180 And, of course, as discussed previously, nobody tells the story of
the state’s own violence. Indeed, “[i]n this process, state killing is barely
perceivable as violence.”181
Beyond merely describing the narratives at play in the Brooks trial, Sarat
goes further and argues that these narratives, which inevitably become diffused
throughout the culture, harm society over and above any harm that arises from
the fact of state killing itself. He writes: “In addition to the actual violence
often unleashed and the linguistic violence done in the process of rendering
state killing abstract, capital trials regularly reaffirm racialized social
conventions as well as flat narratives of purity and danger, responsibility and
excuse, and innocence and guilt.”182 Although trials are sometimes viewed as
a useful site for discourse among multiple competing worldviews,183 Sarat’s
analysis suggests that, at least in the death penalty context, the narrative tropes
employed at trial stifle rather than advance public debate by freezing in place a
set of cultural categories, stereotypes, and preconceptions.
Thus, Sarat’s approach not only offers useful insights about the role of
narratives in constructing our understanding of crime and punishment, but also
provides a distinct normative justification for resisting the current capital
punishment system. Indeed, Sarat appears to argue that capital punishment
should be resisted, over and above any other reasons, precisely because the
narratives of capital punishment impoverish public debate in this way.
According to Sarat, capital punishment constructs and reinforces fixed, often
racist, conceptions of complicated ideas like victim, offender, guilt, innocence,
free will, personal responsibility, causation, and agency.184 One might think
that a great power of trial narratives is their ability to articulate grand cultural
themes and foster social solidarity by allowing the community to heal itself
after the breach of a social norm.185 Yet, Sarat argues that, at least in the death
180. Id. (citing Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. 361).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 125.
183. See, e.g., Berman, Suspicious Story, supra note 21, at 133–34 (“[L]aw is a social
practice that both recognizes the existence of many different narratives and provides the
opportunity to create new narratives that may help forge group identities. Legal proceedings,
therefore, function in part as a site for adjudicating among various explanatory narratives for
describing reality.” (citation omitted)); White, Law as Language, supra note 151, at 444 (“The
multiplicity of readings that the law permits is not its weakness, but its strength, for it is this that
makes room for different voices, and gives a purchase by which culture may be modified in
response to the demands of circumstance.”).
184. Of course, such criticisms might be leveled at all criminal trials, not simply capital
murder cases. Nevertheless, although Sarat does not address this point, it is reasonable to assume
that death penalty narratives may impoverish discourse even more than the narratives in a
noncapital trial because capital punishment is by its nature irreversible. In this respect, a capital
trial implicitly asserts that the narrative reality being conjured in the courtroom is not just
preferable but infallible.
185. Paul Schiff Berman, An Anthropological Approach to Modern Forfeiture Law: The
Symbolic Function of Legal Actions Against Objects, 11 Yale J.L. & Human. 1, 37 (1999)
(“[T]rials not only redress the harm to a community by punishing a guilty individual; they also
‘perform the laws’ so that the community can reenact a sense of its own order and redraw its
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penalty context, these grand themes may stand in the way of truly binding
society together because so many alternative narratives about crime and
punishment are squelched.
By focusing not on the legal niceties of the trial but on the stories told
during the legal process, Sarat’s cultural analysis illuminates the ways in which
the death penalty may impoverish our discourse about crime, its root causes,
and the most effective ways to make society safer. As Sarat observes,
Each narrative of lawless violence—whether of Brooks’s crime or of
the abuse he suffered—reminds us of the failure of state violence to
guarantee security. Each narrative of violence turns us into anxious
citizens caught between a fearful aversion to one kind of violence
and a fearful embrace of another.186
According to Sarat, the narratives that capital trials tell actually harm us as a
polity and deflect our rhetorical and psychological resources from a more
nuanced examination of crime in America.
D. Understanding Law in Popular Culture
The three benefits of a cultural analysis of law I have discussed so far are
all linked to a fourth, broader insight: Law is not an autonomous system of
rational inquiry, but is instead, as Clifford Geertz observed, “a distinctive
manner of imagining the real.”187 Thus, law operates as much by influencing
modes of thought as by determining conduct in any specific case. It is a
constitutive part of culture, shaping and determining social relations.188
Sarat himself has written elsewhere that “legal meaning is found and
invented in the variety of locations and practices that comprise culture, and . . .
those locations and practices are themselves encapsulated, though always
This
incompletely, in legal forms, regulations, and symbols.”189

boundaries.” (citations omitted)); see also id. at 37–38 (arguing that trials function, in part, as
“status degradation ceremon[ies]” (quoting Harold Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful
Degradation Ceremonies, Am. J. Soc. 420, 420–21 (1960))). The link between social solidarity
and criminal punishment was drawn most famously by Emile Durkheim. Emile Durkheim, The
Division of Labor in Society 108 (George Simpson trans., MacMillan Co. 1933) (1893)
(observing that crime constitutes a challenge to the moral framework of society and that “the only
means of affirming [the moral framework] is to express the unanimous aversion which the crime
continues to inspire, by an authentic act which can consist only in suffering inflicted upon the
agent”); see also, e.g., Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity
Through Modern Punishment, 51 Hastings L.J. 829, 834–48 (2000) (using Durkheim’s theory to
argue that people in diverse, secular societies such as U.S. try to forge social solidarity through
criminal punishment). For a particularly detailed discussion of the relationship between
Durkheim and theories of modern punishment, see David Garland, Punishment and Modern
Society 23–81 (1990).
186. Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 125.
187. Geertz, supra note 42, at 184.
188. See Silbey, supra note 36, at 41 (arguing that “law is a part of the cultural processes
that actively contribute in the composition of social relations”).
189. Sarat & Simon, Beyond Legal Realism?, supra note 20, at 21.
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understanding of law and culture as “co-constitutive”190 permits cultural legal
scholars to explore the numerous ways in which legal norms permeate our
everyday lives. Indeed, “[l]ong before we ever think about going to a
courtroom, we encounter landlords and tenants, husbands and wives, barkeeps
and hotel guests—roles that already embed a variety of juridical notions.”191
We cannot escape the categories and discourses that law supplies.
This cultural conception of law clearly is something very broad indeed.
Not only does it encompass formal legal rules and procedures, but also “quasilegal” discourses and practices that sometimes straddle the law/entertainment
boundary.192 These include television court channels, legal talk shows, legal
“thriller” novels and films, public memorials and ceremonies (such as the
monument to victims of the Oklahoma City bombing or candlelight vigils to
build community after hate crimes), and marches on Washington (such as the
“Million Mom March” to lobby for stricter handgun regulations). Even more
broadly, a cultural analysis of law takes into account the often unnoticed
practice of “law talk” in the society at large. Such talk includes abstract (and
often inchoate) ideas of street justice, due process, civil disobedience,
retribution, deterrence, and rights, all of which are frequently invoked in public
discussions and dinner table conversations alike.
Viewing law in this way not only broadens our understanding of law’s
role in culture, it also allows us to see that the relationship of law and culture is
not unidirectional. Legal categories shape broader social discourse. But at the
same time, law talk, diffused throughout society, becomes a source of
alternative conceptions of law:
Legality . . . operates through social life as persons and groups
deliberately interpret and invoke law’s language, authority, and
procedures to organize their lives and manage their relationships. In
short, the commonplace operation of law in daily life makes us all
legal agents insofar as we actively make law, even when no formal
legal agent is involved.193
We have already seen the way death penalty jurors interposed their own ideas
about the criminal justice system in deliberating about a death sentence.194 A
cultural analysis of law makes clear that this kind of negotiation takes place
190. See Julie A. Nice, Equal Protection’s Antinomies and the Promise of a Co-Constitutive
Approach, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1392, 1392 n.2 (2000) (using phrase “co-constitutive theory” to
emphasize mutually constitutive relations of law and society).
191. Sarat & Simon, Beyond Legal Realism?, supra note 20, at 20.
192. See, e.g., Austin Sarat, Imagining the Law of the Father: Loss, Dread, and Mourning
in The Sweet Hereafter, 34 Law & Soc’y Rev. 3, 5–10 (2000) (arguing that sociolegal scholars
must “take on” cultural studies by considering how law exists in a world of film and television
images); Alison Young, Murder in the Eyes of the Law, 17 Stud. L. Pol. & Soc’y 31, 31 (1997)
(exploring how law “appears and reappears in the cinematic text”); see also Richard K. Sherwin,
Picturing Justice: Images of Law & Lawyers in the Visual Media, 30 U.S.F. L. Rev. 891, 893
(1996) (evaluating how narrative and rhetorical strategies of popular culture seep into the
courtroom, and urging legal professionals to be cognizant of popular culture discourses).
193. Ewick & Silbey, supra note 46, at 20.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 120–134.
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constantly, even in more mundane situations, both within formal legal
structures and in everyday life.
Naturally, popular culture also is a potential site for generating alternative
conceptions of legality. In When the State Kills, Sarat spends the last two
chapters directly addressing the death penalty as it exists within the pop
cultural forms of television and film. In both chapters, his analysis illuminates
the possibility that the alternative stories delivered through such powerful
media could challenge the hegemony of official legal discourse about the death
penalty. First, he wades into the debate about televising executions, arguing
both that the survival of capital punishment is largely due to the state’s success
in keeping the death penalty invisible and that public exposure to executions
might galvanize abolitionist activity. Second, he analyzes three recent films
that address the death penalty—Dead Man Walking,195 Last Dance,196 and
The Green Mile197—and concludes that, though these films take ambiguous
stances toward capital punishment as a political matter, the cultural politics of
the films are conservative because the works do not challenge “the basic
categories through which we judge murderers and assess penalties.”198
In his discussion of televising executions, Sarat starts from the premise
that the public is inevitably implicated in the death penalty whether we are
permitted to see the killing or not. He contends:
[T]he public is always present at an execution . . . as an authorizing
audience unseeing and unseen, but present nonetheless. This is the
haunting reality of state killing in a constitutional democracy. So
long as there is capital punishment in the United States, the only
question is the terms of our presence. Are we able to see what we
do?199
He acknowledges the argument that televising executions might result in “a
new kind of voyeurism,” but insists that the issue of witnessing the death
penalty at work goes beyond “manners.”200 Rather, he argues that “[c]ontrol
over vision is . . . a question of control over execution itself.”201
Historically, of course, executions were occasions for large scale public
gatherings. As Michel Foucault has pointed out, “[i]n the ceremonies of the
public execution, the main character was the people.”202 But, significantly, the
public presence at executions was more than simply an occasion for ghoulish
entertainment. Rather, according to Foucault, public participation meant that
resistance to the death penalty was possible:
195. Dead Man Walking (Polygram Filmed Entertainment 1995).
196. Last Dance (Touchstone Pictures 1996).
197. The Green Mile (Warner Brothers 1999).
198. Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 245 (quoting William Connolly, The Will,
Capital Punishment, and Cultural War, in The Killing State, supra note 4, at 187, 194).
199. Id. at 205.
200. Id. (quoting Wendy Lesser, Pictures at an Execution 40 (1993)).
201. Id.
202. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 57 (Alan Sheridan
trans., Pantheon Books 1977) (1975).
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Preventing an execution that was regarded as unjust, snatching a
condemned man from the hands of the executioner, obtaining his
pardon by force, possibly pursuing and assaulting the executioners,
in any case abusing the judges and causing an uproar against the
sentence—all of this formed part of the popular practices that
invested, traversed and often overturned the ritual of public
execution.203
Thus, the public nature of executions functioned in part to ensure popular
sovereignty over the process.
In contrast, the modern American death penalty is almost completely
hidden from view, seen only by a small group of witnesses.204 This shift,
Sarat asserts, is no mere happenstance. Rather, “limiting the visibility of
lawfully imposed death is part of the modern bureaucratization of capital
punishment and of the strategy of transforming execution . . . [into] a soothing
matter of mere administration.”205 Indeed, making the death penalty invisible
to the public may have much the same effect on society at large that it appears
to have on jurors: The execution is rendered less tangible, less real, and less a
part of our responsibility. Although Sarat’s discussion of victim-impact
statements earlier in the book indicates that a desire for vengeance increasingly
may be driving the imposition of the death penalty, such vengeance can be
exercised more freely, he argues, when the society need not witness the
consequences.
Sarat goes further, however, and suggests that the surprising persistence
(and popularity) of the death penalty in America may actually be due in large
part to this invisibility. He contends that, in a society that had already replaced
public punishment and torture with the modern correctional facility, state
killing was anachronistic and could only survive through its transformation
“from a public to a private affair, from an affair of politics to a matter of
administration, and the visual field into which it would be projected had to be
circumscribed.”206 Accordingly, opening capital punishment back up to the
public might well galvanize opposition to the death penalty itself. Moreover,
he argues forcefully that giving the public the ability to view state killing
would also allow the public to appropriate and subvert the conventional (and
state sanctioned) narratives of capital punishment:
[T]he presence of the camera would signify the flood of thousands,
or millions, of uncontrollable looks into the execution chamber. . . . I
believe that with those looks would come resistances, demands,
assertions of power, some calling for more vengeful pain, some for
an end of death imposed in the name of popular sovereignty. Just as
jurors renarrate, rework, and supplement the stories presented to
203. Id. at 59–60.
204. See John D. Bessler, Televised Executions and the Constitution: Recognizing a First
Amendment Right of Access to State Executions, 45 Fed. Comm. L.J. 355, 359–68 (1993)
(surveying decline of public executions in United States).
205. Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 189.
206. Id. at 206.
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them, allowing citizens to view state killing would provide for their
own creative and unpredictable interpretations of it.207
This may be wishful thinking on Sarat’s part.208 After all, television
never presents a transparent exposure to “truth” and so the televised execution
would itself become a narrative presentation that might or might not galvanize
resistance. Indeed, televised executions could impose very powerful visual
narratives to structure and construct the meaning of the death penalty. These
narratives would be framed by media outlets and by the state itself. Moreover,
to the extent that state killing becomes increasingly “medicalized” (through the
use of lethal injections) and seemingly less violent, the process might actually
be made to appear banal and uncontroversial.
Nevertheless, Sarat likely would support televising executions even if it
did not serve his particular instrumental goals. To Sarat, the important point is
that state killing is killing in our name and therefore, as a matter of both
popular sovereignty and democracy, we must be entitled to take part and
witness. Moreover, by opening up the death penalty to the popular gaze, at the
very least the state would have somewhat less control over the available
narratives. Whereas “bureaucratization smooths the way from the authorizing
words to the violent act itself,”209 allowing the public to witness executions
would inevitably add some element of uncertainty and indeterminacy regarding
the political effects of the practice. And to Sarat, anything that disrupts “the
attempt to dignify state killing and to reduce it from political spectacle to
administrative act”210 is worth supporting.
Popular films also have the capacity to provide a source of alternative
narratives about the death penalty. Yet, despite the centrality of capital
punishment to Dead Man Walking, Last Dance, and The Green Mile, Sarat
concludes that, “whatever the intentions of those who made them, [these films]
enact and depend on a conservative cultural politics.”211 For example, he
argues, the films tend to replay narratives about individual responsibility that
207. Id. at 194.
208. Indeed, at least one critic of the death penalty has argued that televising executions
would have a deleterious effect. See Wendy Lesser, Pictures at an Execution 141 (1993)
(asserting that televised executions turn death into a “pure spectacle, unmediated by the
understanding and knowledge that convert spectacle into experience. Far from ‘being there’ with
the condemned man, we would be completely outside of him, viewing him as an easily
liquidatable object . . . .”). Others argue, as does Sarat, that televising executions should be
permitted because it would promote debate. See Jef I. Richards & R. Bruce Easter, Televising
Executions: The High-Tech Alternative to Public Hangings, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 381, 417 (1992)
(“[T]elevised coverage of executions may create feelings of unrest and anger . . . . [H]owever,
these broadcasts probably will promote debate on an issue of high public importance—the death
penalty. Thus, the public debate that televised access likely will cause is precisely the reason that
the government must allow it . . . .”). For further discussion of this question, see generally Gary
N. Howells, et al., Does Viewing a Televised Execution Affect Attitudes Toward Capital
Punishment?, 22 Crim. Just. & Behav. 411 (1995).
209. Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 207.
210. Id. at 208.
211. Id. at 213.
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ignore the broader social context of crime. In the book, Sarat discusses these
films at great length and weaves together a number of different arguments
about them. For the purpose of conveying a sense of Sarat’s approach,
however, a brief outline of just one of his arguments will suffice.
Sarat observes that all three of these films ask the audience to empathize
with a murderer condemned to die. To accomplish this aim, each film pairs the
condemned with one other person—a nun, a lawyer, and a prison guard—who
functions as a proxy for the audience.212 The implicit question is whether we
can have as much compassion as the empathetic friend. Do we recognize our
shared humanity with these murderers? Do they deserve to die? Thus, as Sarat
points out, “the basic structure of viewing is juridical.”213 Although none of
these films involves a trial, the spectator is invited to judge the protagonist.
But, Sarat observes, it is a particular type of juridical role. We judge not the
protagonists’ guilt or innocence, but only whether they should be executed.
“[W]e sit as if on a jury in the penalty phase of a capital trial deciding who
deserves to die and who does not.”214
According to Sarat, this framework serves to distract us from broader
questions about criminal responsibility as well as the meaning of state killing.
Instead, the films focus “intently on the question of whether a single person
deserves to die for his crimes and on the simplifying effort to distinguish evil
from good, the redeemable from those who cannot be saved.”215 Sarat argues
that this focus encourages the viewer to accept the legal and political status
quo.
For example, none of the films explores the systemic social conditions
that are commonly the subject of defense narratives at the penalty phase of the
capital trial.216 Instead, these films substitute an emphasis on personal
character and responsibility. Sarat observes: “To the extent these films
contain an explanation of crime and a justification for punishment, they locate
it in the autonomous choices of particular people.”217 Moreover, Sarat argues
that, because the structuring question in each of these films is whether or not
the protagonist “deserves” to die, the films send two implicit messages:
“[F]irst, citizens can, and will, be held responsible for their acts; second, they
can, and should, internalize and accept responsibility.”218
This emphasis on individual responsibility, according to Sarat, renders the
underlying messages of the films conservative. For example, in Dead Man
Walking, Sister Helen Prejean, a nun who has befriended Poncelet, the
condemned man, asks him why he committed the murder for which he is to be
executed. When Poncelet begins to offer reasons, she rejects them and insists
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 215.
Id. at 243.
Id.
Id. at 244.
See supra text accompanying notes 172–176.
Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 212.
Id.

313664.DOC

2002]

6/18/2002 10:12 AM

CULTURAL ANALYSIS

141

that he must take individual responsibility for the choices he made. She tells
him: “Don’t blame [your accomplice]. You blame him. You blame drugs.
You blame the government. You blame blacks. . . . You blame the kids for
being there. What about Matthew Poncelet? Is he just an innocent, a
victim?”219 These questions are, of course, almost precisely the same ones
that the prosecution in the Brooks trial asked of the social worker.220 And, as
we saw in the discussion of that trial, the film’s focus on individual
responsibility inevitably deflects attention from broader systemic questions of
social structure, environment, or even a challenge to the idea of rational free
will itself.
Thus, Sarat argues that Dead Man Walking, Last Dance, and The Green
Mile repeatedly employ categories, such as agency, will, and responsibility,
“the meaning[s] of which [are] at issue in contemporary culture wars.”221 In
such a simplified view of individual responsibility, the harsh childhood of the
killer is permitted to “‘mitigate’ the crime or to provide ‘extenuating’
circumstances; these experiences are not treated as violences that enter into the
very crystallization of the perpetrator’s will.”222 According to Sarat, instead of
questioning the adequacy of our criminal justice categories, these films “are
grounded on the notion of a responsible person as the proper object of
punishment . . . someone caught up in simplifying narratives of good and
evil.”223 Accordingly, the fundamental ways in which we judge murderers and
assess penalties remain unscathed.
Whether one agrees with Sarat’s particular conclusions or not, his reading
of these films illuminates the ways in which such cultural products both reflect
and reinforce the legal categories implicit in societal discourse about crime and
punishment, categories that appear again and again, not only in death penalty
trials, but in public debate as well. Indeed, the narratives of the films repeat
the standard prosecution narrative of individual agency and responsibility that
Sarat describes in his discussion of the Brooks trial. These narratives (one
from pop culture and one from the courtroom) therefore serve to reinforce each
other and become cultural “truth.” Thus, law and culture are inevitably
intertwined, and law resides not only in the recognizably coercive acts of the
state, but also in the language we take for granted when we conceptualize our
ideas about innocence, guilt, and individual agency.
Moreover, such conceptions can either be reinforced or subverted by the
narratives present in our cultural products, such as television and film.
Although Sarat finds that Dead Man Walking, Last Dance, and The Green Mile
fall short of providing a truly subversive counternarrative to our accepted
cultural categories about crime, one could easily imagine a powerful film that
219. Id. at 225–26 (internal quotation marks omitted).
220. See supra text accompanying note 177.
221. Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 212.
222. William Connolly, The Will, Capital Punishment, and Cultural War, in The Killing
State, supra note 4, at 187, 194.
223. Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 212.
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might someday do so. In addition, the broad dissemination of images of
executions through the media might also become a site for future contestation.
Whether such alternative narratives will emerge in the specific context of the
death penalty debate is unclear. Nevertheless, by expanding the canvas on
which we see the reach of law, a cultural analysis refuses to accept law’s claim
that its domain is limited only to official legal discourse. Rather, law is
embedded in popular culture, as well as in our everyday conversations, our
cognitive categories, and our sense of “folk justice.” And, as with the three
benefits of cultural legal study already discussed, an understanding of the
relationship of law and popular culture, if taken seriously, not only provides a
useful field of study in its own right, it also inevitably poses new avenues for
consideration when thinking about a host of legal policy questions, from the
use of cameras in the courtroom, to the admissibility of a broader range of
narratives at trial, to the televising of executions, to the educative or rhetorical
role of judicial decisions.
CONCLUSION
A cultural analysis of law insists that we recognize the subtle ways in
which law operates to construct our understanding of the world and what we
take to be the “natural” order of things. Even after decades of interdisciplinary
exploration and development, this is still not the approach to legal study most
often taught in law schools or discussed in law journal articles. Although there
may be only a few remaining true believers in legal formalism, most law
teaching and scholarship continues to focus on arguments pitched firmly
within the parameters of legal doctrine. Nevertheless, space for a cultural lens
has gradually opened up within the legal academy. As Robert Post observed a
decade ago:
We have long been accustomed to think of law as something apart.
The grand ideals of justice, of impartiality and fairness, have seemed
to remove law from the ordinary, disordered paths of life. For this
reason efforts to unearth connections between law and culture have
appeared vaguely tinged with exposé, as though the idol were
revealed to have merely human feet. In recent years, with a firmer
sense of the encompassing inevitability of culture, the scandal has
diminished, and the enterprise of actually tracing the uneasy
relationship of law to culture has begun in earnest.224
This cultural analysis, properly understood, need not be an enterprise wholly
independent of doctrinally based legal scholarship or teaching; rather, it is a
fundamental part of any well rounded analysis of legal doctrine.225
Austin Sarat’s wide ranging discussion of the death penalty in America
224. Robert Post, Introduction, in Law and the Order of Culture, at vii (Robert Post ed.,
1991).
225. Of course, serious attention to the relationship between law and culture also
undoubtedly transforms doctrinal analyses to some degree, but given the usefulness and
importance of cultural analysis, this seems to be a salutary development.
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attempts to trace the relationship of law to culture on the terrain of one of
America’s most contested social practices. In so doing, he shows us how
fruitful such an analysis can be. Instead of simply hashing out questions of
policy as if the categories of the debate were fixed and stable, his approach
seeks to identify what the cultural assumptions underlying the categories are,
how they became fixed, and how these unstated categories circumscribe the
range of possible approaches we consider. This cultural analysis understands
that law is more than the recognizable ways in which the state regulates
behavior. Rather, “[l]aw is part of the everyday world, contributing powerfully
to the apparently stable, taken-for-granted quality of that world and to the
generally shared sense that as things are, so must they be.”226
A cultural approach to legal study, as Paul Kahn has emphasized, is
important in and of itself because it allows scholars to understand law more
fully and illuminate law as a branch of meaning-making to be explored just as
any other field of human endeavor. Nevertheless, interdisciplinary legal
scholars need not limit their contributions to such descriptive projects. After
all, a cultural analysis of law also contributes to doctrinally based legal
scholarship by providing new perspectives, new tools for generating normative
policies, and new ways to tackle old debates.
Indeed, the conclusion to When the State Kills is strongly normative.
Sarat suggests that those opposed to the death penalty should abandon the
focus on the immorality of state killing, a focus that has been defined in large
part by the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual
punishments.”227 Instead, he argues that abolitionists would do well to
emphasize that the death penalty simply cannot be administered in a manner
compatible with the commitment to fair and equal treatment embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process.228
This alternative focus takes its cue from U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Harry Blackmun’s famous renunciation of the death penalty toward the end of
his time on the bench. In 1994, Blackmun, who twenty-two years previously
had refused to find that capital punishment violated the Eighth Amendment,229
completed a slow transformation away from this early embrace of the death
penalty by stating flatly that “[f]rom this day forward, I no longer shall tinker
with the machinery of death.”230
Blackmun started from the premise that capital punishment “must be
imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all.”231 Such
226. Sarat & Simon, Beyond Legal Realism?, supra note 20, at 19 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
227. Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 249–51 (citing U.S. Const. amend. VIII).
228. Id. at 251–57; see U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV.
229. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405–14 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
230. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
petition for writ of certiorari).
231. Id. at 1144 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of petition for writ of certiorari)
(citing Furman, 408 U.S. 238).
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reasonable consistency would require “that the death penalty be inflicted
evenhandedly, in accordance with reason and objective standards, rather than
by whim, caprice, or prejudice.”232 Thus,
[w]e hope . . . that the defendant whose life is at risk will be
represented by competent counsel—someone who is inspired by the
awareness that a less than vigorous defense truly could have fatal
consequences for the defendant. We hope that the attorney will
investigate all aspects of the case, follow all evidentiary and
procedural rules, and appear before a judge who is still committed to
the protection of defendants’ rights—even now, as the prospect of
meaningful judicial oversight has diminished. In the same vein, we
hope that the prosecution, in urging the penalty of death, will have
exercised its discretion wisely, free from bias, prejudice, or political
motive, and will be humbled, rather than emboldened, by the
awesome authority conferred by the State.233
Yet, according to Blackmun, “our collective conscience will remain uneasy”
because, “despite the effort of the States and courts to devise legal formulas
and procedural rules to meet this daunting challenge, the death penalty remains
fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice, and mistake.”234
Although Blackmun’s rhetoric was powerful in and of itself, Sarat argues
that the significance of Blackmun’s opinion is that it points to a new way of
framing opposition to the death penalty.
Blackmun’s abolitionism found its locus in neither liberal
humanism nor radicalism nor religious doctrine, nor in the defense of
the most indefensible among us. It is, instead, firmly rooted in the
mainstream legal values of due process and equal protection and in a
deep concern with what state killing does to the condition of
America. Blackmun did not reject the death penalty because of its
violence, argue against its appropriateness as a response to heinous
criminals, or criticize its futility as a tool in the war against crime.
Instead, he shifted the rhetorical grounds.235
Thus, Blackmun did not question the abstract legitimacy of state killing; he
simply conceded that “the death penalty experiment has failed.”236 Moreover,
he concluded that “no combination of procedural rules or substantive
regulations ever can save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional
deficiencies.”237 According to Blackmun, “The basic question—does the
system accurately and consistently determine which defendants ‘deserve’ to
die?—cannot be answered in the affirmative.”238

232. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of petition for writ of certiorari).
233. Id. at 1143 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of petition for writ of certiorari).
234. Id. at 1143–44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of petition for writ of certiorari).
235. Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 252.
236. Callins, 510 U.S. at 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of petition for writ of
certiorari).
237. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of petition for writ of certiorari).
238. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of petition for writ of certiorari).
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In Sarat’s view, Blackmun’s opinion permits abolitionists to “change the
subject from the legitimacy of execution to the imperatives of due process,
from the philosophical merits of killing the killers to the sociological question
of the impact of state killing on our politics, law, and culture.”239
Accordingly, Sarat returns to the normative argument he has been pursuing
from the beginning: that the death penalty should be resisted because of its
effect on American society. And he appears to suggest that the Fourteenth
Amendment due process concerns raised by Justice Blackmun provide a legal
framework for making that argument.
Sarat’s focus on “the sociological question of the impact of state killing
on our politics, law, and culture,” of course, extends far beyond the set of
concerns traditionally encompassed within legal conceptions of due process,
and as a strictly doctrinal matter he is probably stretching the Blackmun
position. Moreover, it is an interesting irony that Sarat, who throughout the
book has explored the ways in which social conceptions of reality are
influenced by legal categories, should ultimately adopt an argument that is
itself defined by the categories of the U.S. Constitution. Sarat might respond
that he is seizing on the Fourteenth Amendment simply because, in the current
political climate, a due process argument is likely to be the most successful
legal/political hook for advocating the abolition of the death penalty. Thus, in
the end, it appears that law constrains even the way in which a cultural analysis
must be framed if it is to be “successful” in changing policy (which in turn
supports Sarat’s point that legal categories help to define the range of
narratives that are deployed throughout society).
More importantly, his arguments, whether or not they turn out to be
legally cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment, demonstrate that a
cultural analysis of law can generate discussion about precisely the sorts of
normative policy questions favored by doctrinally oriented legal scholarship.
For example, many of the issues Sarat explores might never arise except
through an analysis of capital punishment that attends to the intertwined
relationship between law and culture. Thus, although cultural analysis can and
must view itself as a body of knowledge about society that exists
independently from questions of legal doctrine, it need not be limited only to
such an independent existence. Rather, as Sarat’s book makes clear, a cultural
analysis of law also has much to contribute to normative debates about legal
doctrine and social policy.
Indeed, Sarat’s fundamental argument is that capital punishment actually
diminishes democracy itself and that a cultural analysis of the death penalty
demonstrates the ways in which the practice erodes our central democratic and
legal values: “State killing diminishes us by damaging our democracy,
legitimating vengeance, intensifying racial divisions, and distracting us from
the challenges that the new century poses for America. It promises simple
solutions to complex problems and offers up moral simplicity in a morally
239. Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 253.
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ambiguous world.”240 Sarat’s vision of democracy, while not spelled out in
detail, seems premised on the idea that broad ranging discourse is essential and
that we therefore need our social institutions to allow maximum space for
contestation among multiple points of view. To Sarat, democracy appears to
be a mode of public dialogue as much as it is a system of allocating
governmental authority. Thus, democracy takes on a kind of Arendtian quality
as a space of public encounter241 in which we must continually enter into
complex negotiations with the world’s ambiguities, aim to broaden our
framework of analysis and perspective, and recognize that politics (or law) is a
terrain of engagement among multiple competing cultural perspectives.242
Capital punishment and its accompanying narratives, in contrast, impoverish
discourse and efface ambiguity.243
This conception of democracy also provides an additional justification for
the very cultural analysis of law Sarat deploys. When the State Kills is
concerned that the simplification and reduction of complex social phenomena
through limiting narratives will close down the democratic negotiation of
moral ambiguity. As this Essay has observed, a cultural study of law similarly
allows us to resist the potentially simplifying narratives of doctrinal legal
analysis by complicating our assumptions about the relationship of law to
society. Thus, by broadening our understanding of where law is and how it
operates, cultural analysis can itself be seen as supporting a more democratic
societal discourse.
240. Id. at 250.
241. See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 50–58 (1958) (conceptualizing the “public”
as a space of appearance where actors stand before others and are subject to mutual scrutiny and
judgment from a plurality of perspectives). In Arendt’s view, the public “consists of multiple
histories and perspectives relatively unfamiliar to one another, connected yet distant and
irreducible to one another.” Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy 111–12 (2000)
(discussing Arendt). For an interpretation of the Arendtian public in terms of plurality and
democracy, see Young, supra, at 115 (arguing that inclusion of multiple voices “motivates
participants in political debate to transform their claims from mere expressions of self-regarding
interest to appeals to justice[, and] maximizes the social knowledge available to a democratic
public, such that citizens are more likely to make just and wise decisions”); see also Susan
Bickford, The Dissonance of Democracy: Listening, Conflict, and Citizenship (1996)
(elaborating a theory of plurality and democratic discourse). For an application of Young’s gloss
on Arendt to the field of law, see Berman, Suspicious Story, supra note 21, at 128–38.
242. For a similar conception of law as democratic discourse, see Paul Schiff Berman, An
Observation and a Strange but True “Tale”: What Might the Historical Trials of Animals Tell Us
About the Transformative Potential of Law in American Culture?, 52 Hastings L.J. 123, 130–31
(2000) (“[L]egal and quasi-legal discourse, particularly when it is widely dispersed within a
culture, may provide a useful language for both debating and contesting social and political issues
and for adjudicating among the multiple narratives that are inevitably present in a heterogeneous
society.” (footnote omitted)).
243. One wonders, of course, what would happen if this view of democracy came into
tension with more conventional democratic concerns about governmental legitimacy and power.
For example, what if an autocrat, ignoring the overwhelming will of the populace and the wishes
of the legislature, abolished the death penalty by executive order? Such a move might be seen as
antidemocratic in one sense, but it also might help foster the sort of nuanced understanding of
crime and punishment that Sarat seems to associate with successful democratic discourse.
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The particular cultural analysis contained in When the State Kills could
usefully be developed in future scholarship. Both because Sarat is aiming his
book at a popular audience and because he chooses to address many different
aspects of the death penalty in America, he necessarily sacrifices some detail.
For example, though he repeatedly argues for an approach to crime that does
not rely so heavily on the assumption of individual free will, he provides only
generalizations about the sort of alternative analysis he has in mind. Similarly,
his discussion of victim-impact statements as a return to private vengeance
seems overly simplistic. After all, there might be some cultural value in
allowing the narratives of community members to be heard more directly in the
legal process. Indeed, Sarat argues elsewhere that executions should be
televised because public participation in the process could generate alternative
narratives for understanding or resisting the death penalty.244 Likewise, it
seems possible that the call for community participation in criminal trials could
also ultimately make trials more of a forum for alternative narratives about
crime and punishment. Finally, I was disappointed not to see more empirical
research.245 Sarat’s interviews with capital jurors comprise perhaps the most
interesting section of the book, but a number of the chapters are surprisingly
dominated by doctrinal analyses of judicial decisions. If Sarat truly wishes to
show how state killing affects our democracy, our categories for
conceptualizing crime and punishment, our race relations, and our
understanding of moral complexity, we need a more detailed mapping of how
the death penalty affects everyday social attitudes.246 In short, if we are to
understand fully what the death penalty does “to us,” as Sarat keeps insisting
we should, then “we” need to be more present in the analysis.
Nevertheless, a book that points the way toward future fruitful avenues of

244. See Sarat, When the State Kills, supra note 5, at 207–08.
245. This is particularly so because some of Sarat’s most significant contributions in
academia have been based on empirical research. See generally, e.g., Austin Sarat & William
L.F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of Motive in Lawyer/Client Interaction,
22 Law & Soc’y Rev. 737 (1988) (analyzing transcripts of conversations between lawyers and
their clients); Sarat, “. . . The Law is All Over,” supra note 47 (drawing on data derived from
observations of legal services offices in two midsized New England cities, including interviews
with nineteen welfare recipients and the lawyers handling their cases, regarding their perceptions
of the legal system); Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness:
Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer’s Office, 98 Yale L.J. 1663 (1989) (analyzing data gleaned from
observational study of 115 lawyer/client conferences over a thirty-three month period in
California and Massachusetts); see also William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat,
The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . . , 15 Law &
Soc’y. Rev. 631 (1980–1981) (arguing for the value of empirical research to investigate
emergence and transformation of legal disputes).
246. The turn from the social to the cultural, see Sarat & Simon, Beyond Legal Realism?,
supra note 20, at 5–9, should not render irrelevant empirical analyses of how law is received and
reconceptualized by ordinary people in everyday life. See, e.g., Ewick & Silbey, supra note 46, at
23 (“Reconceptualizing legality as an internal and emergent feature of social life requires that we
shift our empirical focus away from law to ‘events and practices that seem on the face of things,
removed from law, or at least not dominated by law from the outset.’” (quoting Sarat & Kearns,
supra note 97, at 55)).
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research can hardly be faulted for failing to pursue fully each and every one of
these paths. And I have confidence that subsequent cultural analyses of the
death penalty, whether by Sarat or others, will excavate the terrain this book
leaves unexplored.
More importantly, we should celebrate the two significant successes of
When the State Kills. First, Sarat develops a context for discussing the death
penalty in America that eschews the traditional moral and political debates and
instead focuses our attention on the broader cultural effects of state killing and
the system that supports it. Second, he demonstrates the value of approaching
legal issues through a cultural lens, both as a significant source of knowledge
about how law makes us who we are as a people and as a contribution to
normative debates about legal doctrine and policy. Thus, by introducing a
popular audience to the core insights of cultural and legal analysis and then
showing why those insights are relevant to public policy, Sarat has helped to
advance both an interdisciplinary academic field and an important societal
debate. One could hardly ask for more than that.

